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INTRODUCTION 
For most of our nation's history, territorial borders have marked 
the First Amendment's legal, practical, and theoretical domain. Infor-
mation flow, whether in the form of persons or materials, and cross-
border regulatory schemes have been physical and tangible in nature. 
Regulatory power at the borders has been grounded in detention, 
exclusion, and search and seizure. Traditional First Amendment the-
ories or justifications have generally assumed that the First Amend-
ment is a wholly domestic concern, one generally impervious to 
events, laws, or persons outside U.S. borders. 1 
Today, however, we live in a world characterized by extraordinary 
advances in communications technology, widespread global travel, 
increasing cross-border commerce, and frequent transnational 
involvements. Information flows at great speed, and in remarkable 
quantity, across our national borders. In a "flatter" world, a single 
speaker can potentially distribute information in digitized form to mil-
lions of people across the world with just a few strokes and clicks.2 
Millions of people can and do travel across international borders to 
associate with family members and others.3 Journalists share and dis-
I See, e.g., Robert D. Kamenshine, Embargoes on Exports of Ideas and Information: 
First Amendment Issues, 26 WM. & MARv L. REv. 863, 865 (1985) ("Most discussions of 
first amendment rights assume that the communication is addressed to a domestic 
audience or at least assume that the domestic or foreign nature of the audience is 
inconsequential."). 
2 See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WoRLD Is FLAT (2007) (describing how 
globalization, fueled by technology, has led to an increasingly interconnected world). 
3 In 2008, the U.S. Department of State estimated that sixty-four million trips 
were taken overseas by U.S. citizens. U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABILI1Y OFFICE, Doc. No. 
GA0-09-989, WIDE RANGE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES PROVIDED TO AMERICAN CITIZENS 
OVERSEAS, BuT IMPROVED MoNITORING Is NEEDED I, (2009), available at http://www. 
gao.gov/new.items/d09989.pdf. 
2010] TERRITORIALITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 545 
tribute information across the globe.4 The United States, like other 
nations, participates in interterritorial agreements, tribunals, and 
processes. Today, the First Amendment increasingly competes and 
often conflicts with the speech, privacy, and association laws of other 
nations. 5 Globalization, digitization, and other modern forces funda-
mentally alter the premise that the First Amendment is solely or prin-
cipally a domestic concern bounded by territory. 
The relationship between territory and the First Amendment has 
become more complicated. But what precisely is that relationship? In 
a digitized and globalized speech environment, to what extent can or 
does the United States continue to rely upon a territorially based reg-
ulatory model with respect to the cross-border flow of information? 
How "open" are our borders in terms of speech and association, both 
as a matter of law and, with the advent of the Web and other commu-
nications technologies, practically speaking? Is the First Amendment 
a set of domestic limitations or a universal human right that applies 
without regard to borders? Scholars have devoted far less effort to sys-
tematically analyzing the intersection of territorial borders and the 
First Amendment than they have to various domestic doctrines and 
concerns. What is immediately apparent is that we do not have a sin-
gle, unitary First Amendment. Rather, we have at least three First 
Amendments: the intraterritorial, the territorial, and the 
extraterritorial. 
The intraterritorial First Amendment affects speech and associa-
tion within U.S. territorial borders and in U.S. territories. There is 
substantial intraterritorial uniformity with regard to speech and associ-
ation rights, owing in part to the supremacy of the First Amendment. 
But inside the United States and its territories, speech and association 
rights still vary depending on one's status and geographic location. 
For instance, noncitizens may e~oy lesser First Amendment rights in 
certain circumstances than citizens,6 different community norms may 
4 See generally LEE C. BoLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, RosusT, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE 
PREss FOR A NEw CENTURY 68-107 (2010) (discussing the future of the press and free-
dom of speech in today's era of "new technologies of communication and 
globalization"). 
5 See, e.g., john Schwartz, Two German Killers Demanding Anonymity Sue Wikipedia's 
Parent, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2009, at A13 (reporting that German ex-convicts' attempt 
to enforce a German privacy law against a U.S. business conflicts with the First 
Amendment). 
6 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952) (rejecting 
Fifth and First Amendment challenges of resident aliens deported on the ground that 
they had once been members of the Communist Party). 
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be used to assess whether sexually explicit speech is obscene,7 and 
some states provide for more robust speech rights than the First 
Amendment mandates as a floor. 8 
The territorial First Amendment refers to the vast regulatory 
scheme that affects cross-border speech and association. With whom 
may American speakers legally interact? What information may they 
share across territorial borders? What may foreign speakers convey 
across our borders? The contours of the territorial First Amendment 
are shaped by national security concerns, the federal government's 
plenary powers with regard to immigration and customs, and the def-
erence generally given by courts to the national government's exercise 
of foreign relations powers. Simply put, the First Amendment has 
long operated very differently at the nation's borders. 
Finally, the extraterritorial First Amendment refers to application 
of First Amendment restrictions outside U.S. territorial borders and 
the scope or domain of speech-protective First Amendment princi-
ples, standards, and norms. Is the First Amendment merely a domes-
tic limitation, or is it a universal human right? Does the First 
Amendment follow the flag, or stop at the water's edge? 
Although the issues raised by the intraterritorial First Amend-
ment are important and sometimes overlap with other territorial con-
cerns, this Article will focus primarily on the territorial and 
extraterritorial First Amendments. The primary concern will be the 
legislative, executive, and judicial treatment of what might generally 
be referred to as the First Amendment's "non-domestic" dimension. 
Part I examines the territorial First Amendment, which defines 
the legal scope of speech and associational liberties at international 
borders and their functional equivalents. As we shall see, the formal 
core of the territorial First Amendment has remained remarkably sta-
ble over time. Today, as in the past, foreign scholars and other speak-
ers have no constitutional right to cross U.S. borders to convey 
information or associate with U.S. audiences. The government may 
deny access to foreign speakers so long as it has a "facially legitimate 
7 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 33 (1973) (explaining that obscenity is 
to be judged according to contemporary community standards). 
8 In PruneYard Shapping Center v. Rnbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Supreme Court 
held that "a state's organic and general law can independently furnish a basis for 
protecting individual rights of speech and assembly." State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 
624 (NJ. 1980) (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81). Some states have mandated 
greater access to private properties than the First Amendment floor requires. See, e.g., 
NJ. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v.J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 777 (NJ. 
1994) (holding that private shopping centers are required to allow leafleting and 
associated expressive activities on their premises). 
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and bona fide reason" for doing so.9 Current federal laws and regula-
tions may also permit officials to exclude foreign speakers on solely 
ideological grounds, a feature of cross-border information control 
that dates to the late 1790s. Moreover, federal law prohibits foreign 
nationals from making direct contributions in U.S. elections10 and 
limits distribution of "foreign political propaganda" inside the United 
States. 11 
Citizens' cross-border speech is also limited in various respects. 
For example, the Logan Act, enacted in 1799, criminalizes unautho-
rized "correspondence or intercourse" with foreign governments.12 
Although international travel is now commonplace, federal laws and 
regulations still place restrictions on travel to certain areas of the 
world. Federal law now prohibits denial or revocation of a passport 
based upon ideological or expressive grounds.13 But the First Amend-
ment does not proscribe restrictions on territorial egress even if the 
purpose of the proposed travel is to engage in expressive, journalistic, 
or associative activities. 14 
At U.S. territorial borders, federal officials retain broad authority 
to search expressive materials. Prior to and during the Cold War, cus-
toms and border laws were enforced to restrict or prohibit the impor-
tation and exportation of films, books, and magazines. 15 For a variety 
of reasons, the regulatory focus has shifted to the cross-border flow of 
technological data and information, particularly as these relate to 
materials that may have military applications.16 Broad customs 
authority has been extended to laptops and other computing devices 
which are filled with personal data and other expressive materials, 
9 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). 
10 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006). 
11 22 u.s.c. § 614 (2006). 
12 18 u.s.c. § 953 (2006). 
13 See22 U.S.C. § 2721 (providing that passports cannot be denied or revoked on 
basis of speech, belief, affiliation, or membership). 
14 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (upholding Cuba travel restrictions). 
15 See Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National 
Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719, 728-34 (1985) (describing 
cross-border speech and association restrictions). 
16 As some scholars have noted, U.S. authorities have altered enforcement strate-
gies to account for the digitization and cross-border sharing of information via the 
Internet. See generally jAcK GoLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHo CoNTRoLS THE INTERNET? 
(2006) (arguing that the Internet has not diminished the authority or relevance of 
national governments and that territorial governance remains the norm). 
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such as medical records, diaries, and photographs. 17 Courts have 
refused to apply a First Amendment "exception" to these border 
searches. 18 Finally, various laws restrict the ability of U.S. citizens and 
resident aliens to maintain contact and associate, both domestically 
and abroad, with foreign missions and other organizations. 
Although the core of the territorial First Amendment remains 
largely intact, Part I shows that territorial borders are not the strong 
regulatory barriers to cross-border information flow that they once 
were. In the mid-1980s, some were bemoaning the existence of a 
"nylon curtain" of federal laws and regulations that operated as an 
ideological barrier at the nation's borders. 19 During the past two 
decades or so, territorial borders have been transformed from rela-
tively hard to much softer barriers. As we shall see, although the 
courts have played some role in terms of territorial liberalization, the 
most important actors have been legislative and executive officials. 
Formal ideological barriers, in particular, have nearly disappeared. 
More generally, legal and regulatory amendments have facilitated the 
cross-border flow of a variety of informational materials. The gradual 
lifting of travel barriers has also increased cross-border association 
and inquiry. In addition to various legal and regulatory changes, digi-
tization and globalization have fundamentally changed the practice 
and governance of cross-border information flow. In combination, 
these legal and social forces have altered the territorial framework 
that has traditionally governed speech, press, and associational liber-
ties. Although we do not have open borders insofar as information 
flow is concerned, the First Amendment is far less territorial than per-
haps at any time in our nation's history. 
Part II examines the extraterritorial First Amendment. Extrater-
ritoriality consists of two basic elements. The first element of extrater-
ritoriality relates to exportation of First Amendment norms, 
principles, and standards. First Amendment exportation has long 
been part of our nation's domestic and foreign policies. For example, 
some U.S. laws apply to foreign speech owing to its domestic effects. 
17 Rasha Alzahabi, Note, Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home when Traveling 
Abroad?: The Fourth Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 IND. L. REv. 
161, 185 (2008). 
18 See infra Part I.C. 
19 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 720 (lamenting that the U.S. border 
has become "a serious barrier to free trade in ideas"); see also Brad R. Roth, The First 
Amendment in the Foreign Affairs Realm: "Domesticating" the Restrictions on Citizen Participa-
tion, 2 TEMP. PoL. & CIV. RTs. L. REv. 255, 256 (1993) (criticizing various limitations, 
including immigration and travel restrictions, on citizen participation in foreign 
affairs). 
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Moreover, through a variety of means, including funding decisions, 
proposed restrictions on the forms of assistance that domestic tech-
nology companies may provide to speech-repressive regimes abroad, 
and efforts to enshrine First Amendment press and expressive free-
doms in international agreements, the United States has historically 
characterized and sought to position the First Amendment as a univer-
sal human right. In the latest instance, courts and legislatures have 
refused to grant recognition to and enforce foreign libel judgments 
on the ground that they were obtained pursuant to foreign speech 
laws that lack First Amendment protections. In sum, policymakers 
have long recognized and supported an extraterritorial First 
Amendment. 
The second element is the extraterritorial application of First 
Amendment limitations. With regard to citizens, although First 
Amendment rights have not frequently been enforced extraterritori-
ally the assumption is that the First Amendment formally applies to 
expressive activities beyond U.S. borders. 20 By contrast, aliens abroad 
are presumed not to enjoy First Amendment rights. Thus, although 
they favor exportation of First Amendment norms in general, policy-
makers have been reluctant to acknowledge that First Amendment 
limitations apply extraterritorially. 
Part III synthesizes the territorial and extraterritorial dimensions 
and reconsiders the modern relationship between territorial borders 
and First Amendment liberties. As noted, the First Amendment is cer-
tainly less territorial as a result of recent political and judicial judg-
ments. That trend is likely to continue. As policymakers continue to 
recognize that Americans' informational, commercial, educational, 
cultural, and artistic interests do not stop at the water's edge, the First 
Amendment will continue to become more cosmopolitan in charac-
ter. Political and judicial interpretations of free speech, press, and 
association guarantees will embrace and facilitate the cross-border 
flow of information. Although territorial governance remains intact-
and likely will so long as there are states-governments will also likely 
continue to experience diminished capacity to control cross-border 
information flow. In the globalized and digitized era, the most impor-
tant First Amendment questions will likely relate to the First Amend-
ment's extraterritorial domain. The First Amendment may become 
more cosmopolitan in this realm as well, in terms of its influence 
20 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (assuming arguendo that the First 
Amendment applies overseas); see also Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 
1991) (concluding that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause "should apply 
extraterritorially"). 
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beyond U.S. borders. However, the United States obviously cannot 
unilaterally export First Amendment norms and principles abroad. 
Moreover, courts are likely to remain hesitant to expand First Amend-
ment guarantees beyond U.S. borders. Indeed there are constitu-
tional, diplomatic, theoretical, and other obstacles to further 
expansion of the extraterritorial First Amendment. But these are not 
insurmountable. The contours of the extraterritorial First Amend-
ment are still developing, and there are avenues for further expan-
sion. Of course, extraterritoriality may work in more than one 
direction. Legal, social, and political forces may bring foreign speech 
regimes to U.S. shores. Hence the First Amendment may also become 
cosmopolitan in the sense that it must compete with and may be influ-
enced by other speech regimes. The question is whether, as a result, 
the First Amendment will lose some of its exclusive and exceptional 
intraterritorial domain. 
I. THE TERRITORIAL FIRST AMENDMENT 
This Part describes the current state of our territorial First 
Amendment. The basic foundation or infrastructure of the territorial 
First Amendment was put in place during the early days of the Repub-
lic. Since that time, officials have exercised the power to exclude and 
remove aliens and to control the import and export of informational 
materials. The territorial First Amendment has not received sustained 
attention during the past two decades. 21 During that period, however, 
there have been significant legal, political, and social changes with 
regard to cross-border speech, press, and association. Foreign per-
sons, influences, and ideas have given rise to numerous territorial 
restrictions, from ideological immigration exclusion laws to limits on 
the importation of foreign films and magazines. Although it has not 
disappeared, fear of foreign persons and ideas has dissipated some-
what over time. Indeed in today's globalized society, many citizens 
eagerly seek out foreign news, ideas, and contacts. As we shall see, in 
many respects cross-border channels of communication are more 
open today than at any time in our nation's history. Thus, while the 
basic territorial framework remains in place numerous fissures have 
appeared in its foundation. The broader implications of these devel-
opments will be addressed in Part III. 
21 The most comprehensive treatment of the subject of restrictions on cross-bor-
der speech and association appears in a 1985 article by Burt Neuborne and Steven 
Shapiro. See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15; see also Roth, supra note 19 (exam-
ining certain restrictions affecting citizen participation in foreign affairs). 
2010] TERRITORIALITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. Territorial Exclusion-Ingress 
The territorial First Amendment limits domestic access to foreign 
persons, ideas, and materials in a number of ways. There is, of course, 
no absolute right to speak to and associate with foreign audiences or 
to gather information from abroad. Persons and materials can be 
stopped at the international border or its functional equivalent, 
searched, and seized for a variety of reasons. For lawful entry, persons 
and physical materials must cross at designated immigration and cus-
toms checkpoints. Lawful material that finds its way onto U.S. soil 
must be made freely accessible. Thus, for example, the Supreme 
Court has held that the U.S. Post Office cannot refuse to deliver legal 
foreign propaganda materials to a domestic addressee absent her 
affirmative request. 22 
The right to see, hear, and associate with a foreign speaker on 
U.S. soil depends entirely upon the speaker's ability to (lawfully) gain 
entry into the United States.23 The sovereign is entitled to control 
access to its territory. Control over international borders includes the 
basic power to determine who may enter.24 As a matter of territorial 
sovereignty, most if not all nation-states exercise some degree of con-
trol over the ingress of aliens.25 The grounds for denial of entry vary. 
In many countries, including some Western democracies, it is rather 
common for speakers to be denied entry or excluded based solely 
upon ideological concerns. Britain, Canada, and South Mrica all have 
recently refused entry to speakers based upon their public statements 
regarding, respectively, Islam, terrorist organizations, and Tibet.26 
22 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (holding that a Post 
Office requirement that required an addressee to affirmatively request receipt of for-
eign communist political propaganda abridged the First Amendment). 
23 The unlawful entrant may, of course, be removed from the United States thus 
terminating the association. 
24 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (discussing relationship 
between political membership and territorial borders); United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,542 (1950) ("Admission of aliens to the United States is a 
privilege granted by the sovereign .... "). 
25 See STEPHEN D. KRAsNER, SoVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 12 (1999) 
(describing this conception of sovereignty as "interdependence sovereignty"). The 
United States, like other nations, also exercises the power of removal. This is a matter 
that relates primarily to what I have referred to as the "intraterritorial" First 
Amendment. 
26 See john F. Bums, Britain Refuses Entry to Dutch Lawmaker Whose Remarks and Film 
Have Angered Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at AS (reporting that British authori-
ties had barred the entry of an alleged anti-Muslim lawmaker); Celia W. Dugger, South 
Africa Bars Dalai Lama from a Peace Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at AIO 
(reporting that the Dalai Lama was barred from a conference because his presence 
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British officials have published a master list of those excluded from 
entering the country, in part to demonstrate to the world the nation's 
"values and standards."27 These and other nations typically cite con-
cerns regarding national security and other broad public interests as 
the bases for territorial exclusions. 
The United States has excluded or removed alien persons, often 
for purely ideological reasons, throughout its history. Reflecting a 
deep-seated fear of foreign ideas and influences, the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts of 179828 authorized the President to remove any alien con-
sidered dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.29 To 
this day, the President is granted authority to remove citizens of 
enemy nations, without so much as a pre-removal hearing. 30 
In addition to imposing racial restrictions, early immigration laws 
imposed blanket exclusions on classes of aliens who were believed to 
espouse certain ideologies and to be involved in disfavored associa-
tions.31 From World War I through the end of the Cold War, Con-
gress authorized visa denials, immigration exclusions, and 
deportations of anarchists and Communists, and other persons 
deemed a threat to the interests and security of the United States.32 
During the Cold War, the United States became a closed and 
insular society in certain respects. The national mood was unmistaka-
bly manifested at the borders, which were closed to foreign ideologies 
like communism and socialism. Section 212(a)(27) of the McCarran-
would not be in South Africa's "best interests"); Robert Mackey, Canada Bars 
'Infandous' British Politician, Journalists Reach for Dictionaries, LEnE: N.Y. TIMES NEWS 
Bwc, Mar. 20, 2009, http:/ /thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/canada-bars-
infandous-british-politicianjoumalists-reach-for-dictionaries/ (reporting that Cana-
dian officials had barred the entry of a member of the British Parliament who had 
allegedly openly supported Hamas). 
27 John F. Bums, Britain Identifies 16 People Barred from Entering the Country in the 
Past 6 Months, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A6. 
28 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 
66, 1 Stat. 577 (expired 1801); Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800); 
Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802). 
29 See Act of June 25, 1798, § 1, 1 Stat. at 570-71. 
30 See 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006). Fear offoreign influence extends to U.S. campaign 
laws. Federal campaign finance laws currently prohibit foreign nationals from mak-
ing direct contributions in federal, state, and local elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006). 
31 See, e.g., Alien Immigration Act, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 (1903). 
32 See, e.g., Anarchist Act of 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 (authorizing the removal 
of alien anarchists); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952) (rejecting a 
First Amendment challenge to a law providing for the deportation of communists); 
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1904) (upholding the 
removal of an alien anarchist). 
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Walter Act,33 enacted in 1952 over President Truman's veto, author-
ized exclusion of aliens who sought to enter the United States "solely, 
principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prej-
udicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or secur-
ity of the United States."34 Section 212(a) (28) of the McCarran-
Walter Act authorized purely ideological exclusions of "anarchists" 
and communist affiliates.35 From 1952 through the late 1970s, 
thousands of aliens were deemed excludable under section 
212(a) (28) based principally or solely upon ideological grounds, forc-
ing them to seek waivers from the Attorney General in order to enter 
the country.36 During this period, State Department and immigration 
officials excluded numerous foreign scholars, artists, and musicians 
under the McCarran-Walter Act's ideological exclusion provisions.37 
These enactments assumed, of course, that ideological exclusions 
were valid under the First Amendment. In Kleindienst v. Mandel,38 the 
Supreme Court held that aliens have no First Amendment right to 
enter the country to convey ideas or information, or to associate with 
domestic persons and entities.39 The Court also held, however, that 
audiences within the United States possess a First Amendment right to 
receive information from foreign speakers. 40 That includes, said the 
Mandel Court, the right "'to have the alien enter and to hear him 
explain and seek to defend his views.' "41 In a portion of the opinion 
that may come to have particular salience in the digital era, the Court 
noted that the mere possibility that the message could be delivered by 
means other than face-to-face interaction with the speaker did not sat-
isfY First Amendment concerns.42 
33 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)). 
34 !d. § 212(a) (27), 66 Stat. at 184 (repealed 1990). 
35 !d. § 212(a)(28) (A)-(C), 66 Stat. at 184-85 (current version at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(D)). 
36 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 723. 
37 See John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Acad-
emy, and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1481, 1496-97 (1988) (discussing the 
effect of ideological deportation and exclusion on the academy and on academic free-
dom); Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 
100 HAR.v. L. REv. 930, 935, 940-41 (1987) (discussing ideological exclusions). 
38 408 u.s. 753 (1972). 
39 !d. at 767-68. 
40 !d. at 769; see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (recog-
nizing a right to receive information). 
41 Mande~ 408 U.S. at 764-65 (quoting Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 631 
(E.D.N.Y. 1971)). 
42 ld. at 765. 
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Although it recognized domestic audiences' right to hear or 
receive, the Mandel Court made clear that visa denials and exclusions 
are not to be judged according to ordinary First Amendment stan-
dards. Rather, said the Court, in this context the government is only 
required to provide a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the 
exclusion.43 According to the Court, this standard acknowledges the 
government's plenary authority with regard to entry into the United 
States.44 As scholars have noted, Mandel"raises as many questions as it 
answers."45 It appears that the government is required to at least pro-
vide some basis or explanation for its exclusion. But it remains 
unclear, even today, whether the First Amendment prohibits the gov-
ernment from excluding an alien from the United States based solely 
upon ideological grounds. 4 6 
In the late 1970s, the political branches repealed the more bla-
tant ideological barriers to entry. The McGovern Amendment,47 
enacted in 1977, restricted the government's ability to exclude sus-
pected Communists or anarchists under section 212(a) (28) of the 
McCarran-Walter Act.48 In a 1987 joint conference report, moreover, 
Congress concluded that the executive branch had misused section 
212(a)(28) to exclude noncitizens based solely upon their ideology.49 
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration then turned to section 
212(a) (27) of the Act, which, as noted, allowed for exclusion when 
aliens' activities in the United States would be "prejudicial to the pub-
lic interest."50 Many foreign officials and scholars were denied visas 
under this provision.51 As several court decisions from the 1980s 
showed, the phrase "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" was not 
43 !d. at 770. 
44 !d. at 768-69; see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585-92 (1952) 
(upholding the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which barred the entry of aliens who 
advocated for the violent overthrow of the U.S. government or associated with others 
who did so, against a First Amendment challenge). For a critical analysis of the gov-
ernment's interests in ideological exclusion, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS To 
THE CoNSTITUTION 152-61 (1996). 
45 Shapiro, supra note 37, at 936. 
46 See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 ("What First Amendment or other grounds may be 
available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is 
advanced is a question we neither address nor decide in this case."). 
47 Pub. L. No. 95-105, 91 Stat. 844 (1977) (repealed 1990). 
48 !d. § 112, 91 Stat. at 848. 
49 H.R. REP. No. 100475, at 162-63 (1987) (Conf. Rep.). 
50 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(a)(27), 66 Stat. 
163, 184 (repealed 1990); see also Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 726-27 
(describing Reagan administration exclusions). 
51 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 726-27. 
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particularly helpful in resolving the scope of the government's author-
ity to engage in ideological exclusion.52 
In 1990, Congress passed the Moynihan-Frank Arnendment,53 
which expressly prohibited the deportation or exclusion of nonci-
tizens "because of the alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, state-
ments, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations 
would be lawful within the United States."54 With that amendment, 
the United States eliminated a significant ideological territorial bar-
rier.55 Absent a clear constitutional mandate, however, Congress was 
of course always free to change course. 
Indeed, when concerns regarding terrorism mounted in the late 
1990s, Congress enacted new territorial exclusion provisions. In 1996, 
Congress delegated to the State Department the authority to exclude 
"representative[s]" and "member[s]" of terrorist organizations.56 
Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress imposed addi-
tional restrictions on entry. 57 The war on terrorism is, in part, a war of 
ideas and ideology. Thus, it should not be surprising that affiliation 
with terrorist causes and groups has become a possible ground for 
52 Compare El-Wenalli v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (con-
cluding that Mandel does not permit courts to probe the wisdom or basis of proffered 
reasons for exclusion), with Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 (D. Mass. 1985) 
(holding that mere membership in an organization alleged to be a communist-front 
association was not a sufficient statutory basis for denial under the McCarran-Walter 
Act), andAbourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880,887 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that the 
government lacks authority to exclude an alien under section 212 (a) (27) of the 
McCarran-Walter Act based solely on a proposed message), vacated, 785 F.2d 1043 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
53 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. 
54 Id. § 601, 104 Stat. at 5071. Immigration laws were generally amended in the 
1990s to limit excludable offenses primarily to conduct rather than speech or ideol-
ogy. For example, current immigration laws make a person who has engaged in ter-
rorist activities ineligible for certain visas. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (i) (I) (2006). 
Ineligibility may be waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security at the recommen-
dation of the State Department. See 22 C.F.R. § 40.301 (2009). 
55 Immigration laws continue to grant officials discretion to exclude aliens based 
upon "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a) (3) (C) (i). 
56 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 411, 110 Stat. 1214, 1268-69 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006)). 
57 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of8, 12, 15, 18, 22, 28, 31, 42, 
49, and 50 U.S.C.) (imposing more restrictive rules on the immigration of suspected 
terrorists). 
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exclusion. A provision of the USA PATRIOT Act58 permits the 
Department of Homeland Security to bar from the United States any 
alien that has used a "position of prominence within any country to 
endorse or espouse terrorist activity."59 The U.S. State Department 
has interpreted this provision to authorize exclusion of aliens based 
upon "irresponsible expressions of opinion by prominent aliens who 
are able to influence the actions of others."60 The REAL ID Act of 
200561 rendered aliens excludable on the same substantive grounds, 
regardless of whether they held a "position of prominence" in their 
home countries.62 
The extent to which federal officials have relied upon the 
"endorse or espouse" provision is unclear. Civil libertarians claim that 
during the past several years "dozens" of scholars, journalists, and 
other putative speakers have been excluded based solely upon ideo-
logical grounds.63 In some cases, however, it appears that either no 
explanation for the exclusion was given or the government purported 
to rely upon other provisions of federal law to deny entry. This was 
true, for example, in two recent high-profile cases involving scholars 
denied entry to the United States.64 In one case, the government ini-
tially failed to provide any reason for the exclusion. 65 In the other, 
although the government initially appeared to rely upon the USA 
PATRIOT and REAL ID exclusion provisions, it later asserted that the 
alien scholar was barred under laws prohibiting entry to those who 
give financial support to known terrorist organizations.66 
The executive branch has consistently asserted that it has the 
authority to engage in ideological exclusion. An appellate brief filed 
58 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8, 12, 15, 18, 22, 28, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
59 /d. § 411 (a) (1) (A), 115 Stat. at 345-46. 
60 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FoREIGN AFFAIRS MANuAL§ 40.32 at n.6.2(3) (2005). 
61 Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C.). 
62 See id. § 103(a), 119 Stat. at 306-07. 
63 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE ExcLUDED 8 (2007), available at http://www. 
aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/the_excluded_report.pdf. 
64 See Am. Sociological Ass'n v. Chertoff, 588 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172-73 (D. Mass. 
2008) (ordering the government to provide some specific basis for exclusion); Am. 
Acad. of Religion v. Chertoff, No. 06 CV 588(PAC), 2007 WL 4527504, at *15-16 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007) (finding that alien was excluded not under PATRIOT Act's 
"endorse or espouse" provision, but on basis of donations made to organizations sup-
porting known terrorist groups), vacated sub nom. Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napoli-
tano, 573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009). 
65 See Am. Sociological Ass'n, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 170. 
66 See Am. Acad. of Religion, 2007 WL 4527504, at *3-4. 
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by the George W. Bush administration claimed that Congress may 
constitutionally exclude persons based solely upon ideology, beliefs, 
or memberships.67 The Obama administration has been urged to 
renounce and disclaim this authority but has thus far refused to do 
so. 68 That does not mean, however, that the administration is cur-
rently engaging in ideological exclusion. Indeed in two recent cases, 
the Obama administration lifted bans on prominent Muslim scholars 
who had been denied entry visas by the previous administration. 69 
Whatever other constitutional ambiguities it may contain, Mandel 
reaffirmed Congress's longstanding power "'to exclude aliens alto-
gether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and condi-
tions upon which they may come to this country.' "70 Like other 
nations, the United States continues to exercise this broad sovereign 
power. As recently as the 1980s, the federal government frequently 
engaged in ideological exclusions. 71 Changes to immigration laws, 
some enacted in furtherance of international commitments to facili-
tate cross-border information flow, have denied the executive branch 
general authority to exclude aliens based solely upon ideology.72 
Moreover, recent administrations have seemed reluctant to rely upon 
any supposed authority in the USA PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts to 
exclude aliens based solely upon their beliefs or associations. Future 
administrations will undoubtedly face pressure to exclude aliens based 
upon their associations and beliefs. For now, whether the territorial 
First Amendment permits the government to deny domestic audi-
ences an opportunity to hear or associate with an alien in person 
based solely upon what she has to say remains an open question. 
B. Travel Restrictions-Egress 
Visiting with alien speakers is of course not the only way to gather 
information and share ideas with foreigners. For scholars, politicians, 
artists, and many others, cross-border travel is a significant avenue of 
communication and information gathering. 
67 See Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 52-59, Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napoli-
tano, 573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-0826-CV). 
68 John Schwartz, U.S. Is Urged to Lift Antiterror Ban on Foreign Scholars, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2009, at A19. 
69 Sarah Lyall, In Shift, U.S. Lifts Visa Curbs on Professor, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2010, 
atA6. 
70 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Lem Moon Sing v. 
United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895)). 
71 See Neubome & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 726--27. 
72 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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Although it is difficult to imagine, early in our nation's history 
the federal government did not formally or systematically regulate for-
eign travel. Prior to World War I, international travel from the United 
States was regulated pursuant to a set of ad hoc and informal practices 
involving the State Department's authority to grant or deny pass-
ports.73 During World War I, Congress enacted the first law prohibit-
ing foreign travel without a valid passport.74 Mter the war, the State 
Department imposed certain geographic limits on travel under U.S. 
passports. 75 Ideological restrictions on travel were common during 
certain historical periods. During the Cold War, in particular, State 
Department officials frequently prevented American communists 
from traveling abroad. 76 Prominent Americans who were denied pass-
ports during the McCarthy era included Arthur Miller, Paul Robeson, 
and Linus Pauling. 77 
In the late 1970s, Congress substantially revised executive author-
ity with respect to foreign travel. The 1978 Amendment to the Pass-
port Act78 prohibited executive officials from unilaterally imposing 
area restrictions on travel, except during certain declared emergen-
cies.79 But laws and regulations imposing economic sanctions and 
trade embargoes have often acted as de facto international travel 
bans. In the 1980s, for example, the Treasury Department promul-
gated regulations that treated a host of expenditures related to travel 
to Cuba as prohibited economic transactions.80 Depending on the 
nature and number of expenditures covered, these sorts of regula-
tions can effectively create a travel ban with respect to the disfavored 
nations. The principal goal of such trade embargoes, which currently 
apply to several nations, is to isolate targeted countries economically 
and to deprive them of the benefit of U.S. dollars. The embargoes 
also further diplomatic interests. The First Amendment speech, press, 
and association costs of these measures can be quite substantial, inso-
73 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 734-35 (discussing the history of 
limitations on foreign travel). 
74 See Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, §§ 1-2, 40 Stat. 559, 559. 
75 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 734. 
76 See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 501-02 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 
u.s. 116, ll7-20 (1958). 
77 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 739. 
78 Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2lla). 
79 !d. § 124, 92 Stat. at 971. Today, area restrictions may only be imposed with 
the acquiescence of Congress pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2006). 
80 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (2009) (listing restricted activities and expenses 
relating to travel to Cuba); see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242-43 (1984) (hold-
ing that Cuba travel restrictions do not violate the right to travel abroad). 
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far as citizens and resident aliens wish to travel abroad for expressive, 
journalistic, academic, or associative purposes. 
The First Amendment arguably places greater constraints on the 
government's control over citizens' territorial egress than it does on 
ingress from foreign nations. In contrast to foreign aliens, of course, 
U.S. citizens possess First and Fifth Amendment rights .. In reviewing 
passport revocations and denials, the Supreme Court has grudgingly 
assumed that "First Amendment protections reach beyond our 
national boundaries."81 The Court has also recognized that the free-
dom to travel abroad "is a constitutional liberty closely related to 
rights of free speech and association."82 It has acknowledged that for-
eign travel is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.83 The Court has not, however, recognized any fundamental 
First Amendment right to travel abroad.84 
The Court has held that the First Amendment is implicated when 
a citizen's right to travel abroad is expressly conditioned upon the 
surrender of First Amendment rights.85 Nevertheless, First Amend-
ment liberties are not as robust at the territorial borders as they are 
within the United States.86 For example, the First Amendment pro-
tects a U.S. citizen who wishes to travel from California to New York to 
study and write about New York City's culture. In contrast, the 
Supreme Court has held that a citizen's mere desire to travel for pur-
poses of gathering information does not implicate significant First 
81 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981). 
82 Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964). 
83 See id. (noting the connection between the First Amendment and international 
travel). 
84 Kamenshine, supra note 1, at 893. 
85 See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 507 (holding that the denial of a passport on the basis 
of communist affiliation violates the Fifth Amendment and that First Amendment 
interests could not be dismissed by asserting that the right to travel could be exercised 
by relinquishment of affiliation with the organization); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 
130 (1958) (holding that the Secretary of State lacked authority to refuse the issuance 
of a passport on the basis of alleged beliefs, associations, or ideological matters). The 
Court has expressly recognized a Fifth Amendment liberty interest in traveling 
abroad. See id. at 125 ("The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen 
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment."). 
86 The issue is territorial rather than intraterritorial owing to the fact that the trav-
eler, while presently located within the United States, seeks to cross the territorial 
border. She is free to move up until the time she encounters the border. In contrast, 
the alien subject to deportation is presently located on U.S. soil and is subject to 
discharge against her will to some other territory. 
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Amendment concerns.87 It has also held that the government may 
restrict foreign travel when a speaker's conduct or speech may pose a 
threat to foreign diplomacy or national security.88 The President may 
also prohibit travel in national emergencies, as President George W. 
Bush did in 2003 with respect to travel to Iraq, without running afoul 
of the First Amendment.s9 
Although the United States has historically exercised significant 
control over its citizens' territorial egress, including enforcement of 
some ideological barriers, in recent decades the federal government 
has not placed substantial restrictions on foreign travel. Indeed, today 
there are very few international travel restrictions in place. None of 
the existing restrictions are formally or explicitly grounded solely on 
ideological concerns. In 1991, Congress specified as impermissible 
bases for passport denial, revocation, or restriction "any speech, activ-
ity, belief, affiliation, or membership, within or outside the United 
States, which, if held or conducted within the United States, would be 
protected by the first amendment."90 
Although the State Department warns against travel to certain 
countries, such as North Korea and Iran, the government does not 
enforce an outright travel ban with respect to these or any other 
nations.91 The recent trend has been to lift or liberalize general travel 
bans. For example, a ban on travel to Libya was lifted in 2004.92 Fur-
ther, the Obama administration has recently granted a general license 
87 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); see also Freedom to Travel Campaign v. 
Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Cuba travel restrictions 
did not implicate the First Amendment). 
88 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981) (upholding the denial of a pass-
port to person who engaged in repeated disclosures of intelligence operations and 
names of intelligence personnel). The Agee Court concluded that the denial was 
based in part on the putative traveler's conduct and that any speech involved was not 
protected by the First Amendment. Jd. at 308-09. 
89 See Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 559 F.3d 595, 605 (7th Cir. 
2009) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the imposition of sanctions on a 
person who traveled to Iraq to act as a "human shield," on the ground that sanctions 
applied to conduct rather than speech). 
90 22 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006). Not all associational grounds have been eliminated 
from the immigration exclusion provisions. For example, an alien who is an officer, 
official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is 
deemed excludable on the ground of participation in terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182 (a) (3) (B) (i) (2006). 
91 However, citizens travel to some of these places at their peril. See Choe Sang-
Hun, North Korea Says It Is Holding Two American 7V Reporters, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
2009, at Al3. 
92 Fred Barbash & Peter Slevin, U.S. Lifts Ban on Travel to Libya, WASH. PosT, Feb. 
27, 2004, at Al6. 
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for travel to Cuba to all U.S. citizens with "close relatives" there.93 
This will obviously facilitate "intimate" association outside U.S. terri-
tory.94 Bipartisan legislation recently introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives would lift all remaining restrictions on travel to and 
expenditures in Cuba.95 The Obama administration also recently 
lifted a twenty-two year ban on entry into the United States by H.I.V.-
positive people, a decision that will allow international AIDS research-
ers and activists to meet in the United States.96 The emerging trend, 
at least during the past decade or so, has favored liberalization of 
cross-border travel. This is important not only to economic opportu-
nities abroad, but to cross-border information sharing and association 
as well. 
Existing regulations concerning economic embargoes and for-
eign travel expenditures are also relatively permissive, particularly 
with regard to travel for speech, information-gathering, academic, and 
other expressive purposes. For example, current federal regulations 
regarding travel to Cuba, which at this point remains subject to a 
trade embargo, allow for the issuance of general or specific licenses to 
scholars, professionals,journalists, and others.97 Specific licenses may 
also be granted for travel relating to familial obligations, religious 
activities, humanitarian projects, and cultural performances or exhibi-
tions.98 The list of travelers eligible for general or specific licenses has 
steadily expanded in recent years, with specific regard for press, aca-
demic, and expressive activities. 
Of course, the requirement that citizens and resident aliens 
obtain a license to engage in cross-border expressive activities can 
itself be a substantial restriction, one that would be an invalid prior 
93 OFFICE OF FoREIGN AssETs CoNTROL, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GuiDANCE ON 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CUBA TRAVEL AND TRADE-RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS 
APPROPRIATIONS Acr, 2009, at 1 (2009), available at http:/ /www.treas.gov/offices/ 
enforcement/ ofac/programs/ cuba/ omni_guide.pdf; see Omnibus Appropriations 
Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 621, 123 Stat. 524, 678 (directing the Treasury Depart-
ment to defund certain travel restrictions); see also William E. Gibson, More Cuba Trips 
Expected, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A20 (suggesting that the Obama administration 
may lift the Cuba travel embargo). 
94 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (recognizing "inti-
mate" and "expressive" associations). 
95 See Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act, H.R. 874, 111 th Cong. § 2 (2009); Liza 
Gross, Bill Aims to End Cuba Travel Ban, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 11, 2009, at 7A. 
96 Julia Preston, Obama Lifts a 22-Year Ban on Entry into U.S. by H. I. V.-Positive People, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2009, at A9. 
97 See 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.560(a) (1)-(12) (2009) (providing for general and specific 
licenses for a variety of individuals and organizations). 
98 See id. §§ 515.561, 515.566, 515.575, 515.567. 
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restraint if enforced within U.S. borders. Moreover, despite recent 
liberalization, current licensing restrictions can still substantially affect 
vital First Amendment interests relating to free speech, inquiry, associ-
ation, and academic freedom.99 
In addition to economic embargoes and licensing restrictions, 
travel from (and to) the United States today is subject to new techno-
logically enhanced controls. In particular, federal officials currently 
utilize computerized terrorist "watchlists," including the so-called "No 
Fly List,"100 to regulate air travel from and to the United States. Trav-
elers have their names checked against a federal database and can be 
denied egress or ingress if found to be on the watchlist. 101 Civil liber-
tarians have asserted that protesters and activists have been placed on 
the list for purely ideological reasons, a claim that has been difficult to 
assess owing to the lack of transparency concerning the list. 102 
In sum, the basic territorial framework relating to physical egress 
remains in place. The territorial First Amendment recognizes that 
domestic residents have an interest in cross-border travel and move-
ment. The right resides formally in the Fifth Amendment, although it 
has a First Amendment component. One cannot be denied the right 
of egress on condition that she disassociate from a lawful group or 
enterprise or, presumably, take an oath of loyalty to the United States. 
It does not appear that the United States currently imposes any purely 
ideological restrictions on exit from the country. Travel rights can, 
however, be outweighed by countervailing governmental interests in 
diplomacy and national security. Economic embargoes, licensure 
requirements, and "no fly" restrictions continue to limit the cross-bor-
der exchange of persons, information, and ideas. Nevertheless, the 
trend with regard to most of these measures has been to liberalize 
restrictions on cross-border movement and exchange. 
99 See, e.g., Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 
545 F.3d 4, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that regulations restricting educational 
programs offered in Cuba by U.S. academic institutions did not violate the First 
Amendment); see also Roth, supra note 19, at 276 (criticizing narrowness of some 
travel embargo exemptions). 
100 See jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REv. 271, 
321-22 (2008) (describing the compilation and use of the No Fly List). 
101 See 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.49a, 122.75a (2009). 
102 Eric Lichtblau, Terror List Wrongly Includes 24,000, While Some Actual Suspects 
Escaped It, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A22. Critics have also claimed that the terrorist 
watchlist is plagued by serious problems of over- and under-inclusiveness. Id. 
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C. Commerce: Import and Export Controls 
The territorial First Amendment restricts cross-border contacts in 
a variety of ways. As discussed above, travel restrictions can signifi-
cantly affect in-person information exchange and association. Restric-
tions on cross-border commercial exchange can also have an effect on 
First Amendment speech, press, and associational interests. This sec-
tion discusses the principal import and export controls associated with 
the territorial First Amendment. 
The United States has a vast and complex regulatory system with 
respect to the cross-border exchange of tangible and intangible prod-
ucts, data, and informational materials. Historically, federal laws and 
regulations have restricted the cross-border exchange of a wide variety 
of First Amendment materials, including books, magazines, various 
artistic works, television broadcasts, and computer code. Since the 
founding, Congress has authorized broad search and seizure authority 
at U.S. territorial borders.103 Congress has express constitutional 
authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. 104 It also pos-
sesses the inherent sovereign power to protect the nation from harm-
ful articles of commerce. In this context, as in others, the territorial 
First Amendment is of a markedly different character than its intrater-
ritorial counterpart. As the Supreme Court observed in a decision 
upholding the seizure of allegedly obscene films by customs agents: 
"Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the 
national borders rest on different considerations and different rules 
of constitutional law from domestic regulations."105 
1. Trading with the Enemy 
Much of the modern legal and regulatory architecture for the 
regulation of information flow at the national borders was constructed 
during and as a direct response to World War I. The Trading with the 
Enemy Act106 (TWEA), enacted in 1917, regulates commercial trade 
with designated "enemy" nations. 107 The restrictions imposed under 
TWEA have varied in response to shifting foreign policies over the 
years. Some of the travel and trade restrictions discussed in the pre-
ceding sections were authorized pursuant to TWEA. 108 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (noting that federal 
laws authorize "plenary customs power" at the border). 
104 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
105 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973). 
106 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2006). 
107 See id. § 2 (defining "enemy" within the statute). 
108 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 728-29, 734-35. 
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As noted, the central goal of these border controls and embar-
goes is to isolate certain disfavored or enemy regimes economically. 
First Amendment interests can be significantly affected by TWEA's 
enforcement. For example, TWEA's trade restrictions have been used 
over the years to ban or restrict the cross-border exchange of a broad 
array of informational materials, including books, films, periodicals, 
and other expressive material. 109 At the height of the Vietnam War in 
the 1960s, federal officials seized books and newspapers produced in 
North Vietnam and China and refused to allow their entry into the 
United States until the addressees obtained import licenses.l10 
Addressees were required to identify themselves to government offi-
cials-and to persuade them that the country from which the infor-
mation had been exported was not receiving any financial benefit 
from the importation.111 Border seizures and restrictions were com-
mon during the period of war and civil unrest that prevailed in the 
1960s and 1970s. Aggressive enforcement continued into the 1980s, 
when the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) seized a variety of 
books and magazines imported from Cuba.112 
In response to federal enforcement activities under TWEA, Con-
gress enacted two laws that were generally intended to facilitate the 
exchange of information with foreign nations (including those subject 
to economic embargoes). The Berman Amendment,113 enacted in 
1988, precludes the executive from interfering with the import or 
export of lawful "informational materials" under TWEA and other 
federal laws. 114 The class of "informational materials" is broadly 
defined in regulations to include, without regard to the format or 
medium of expression, "[p] ublications, films, posters, phonograph 
records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact discs, 
CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds." 115 
109 !d. at 728-33. 
llO !d. at 730. 
Ill !d. But cf. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,307 (1965) (invalidating a 
statute directing the Post Office not to deliver foreign communist political propa-
ganda unless the addressee specifically requested its delivery). 
ll2 Neubome & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 731. 
113 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2502, 
102 Stat. 1107, 1371 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (2006)). 
ll4 See Laura A. Michalec, Note, Trade with Cuba Under the Trading with the Enemy 
Act: A Free Flow of Ideas and Information?, 15 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 808, 816-19 
(1991-1992) (describing the history of the Berman Amendment). 
ll5 31 C.F.R. § 500.332 (2009) (defining "informational materials"). But see id. 
§ 500.332(b) (1) (stating that the exemption does not apply to certain controlled 
commodities under the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. 
§§ 2401-2420 (2006)). 
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Contrary to the apparent intent of the Berman Amendment, 
OFAC continued after its passage to interpret "informational materi-
als" quite narrowly. For example, the agency claimed that the Berman 
Amendment's prohibition was not applicable to original artwork. 116 
That interpretation was rejected by a federal district court.117 It also 
claimed that the broadcast of the 1991 Pan American Games from 
Cuba was not within the regulatory exemption relating to "informa-
tional materials," an interpretation one court deemed to be reasona-
ble.118 In the Free Trade in Ideas Act of 1994,119 Congress responded 
to the agency's interpretations by essentially reiterating the broad reg-
ulatory exemption with respect to "informational materials."120 
As a result of these enactments and implementing regulations, 
federal regulatory agencies are required to exempt an array of "infor-
mational materials" from all U.S. import and export controls. Thus, 
the territorial First Amendment permits federal officials to monitor 
and regulate trade with designated enemy nations. In recognition of 
the substantial First Amendment interests at stake with regard to cross-
border information exchange, however, Congress (and in some cases 
the courts) have constrained agencies' power to prohibit import or 
export of certain trade materials that are "informational" in nature. 
The Berman Amendment, the Free Trade in Ideas Act, and imple-
menting regulations effectively ended the practice of seizing foreign 
novels, pamphlets, and magazines at the territorial border. As the dis-
cussion that follows demonstrates, however, some significant restric-
tions on the cross-border exchange of information remain in place. 
116 See Cernuda v. Heavy, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1546, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
117 See id. at 1554 (rejecting an agency interpretation that artwork did not consti-
tute informational material). 
118 See Capital Cities/ ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1014-15 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (holding that an OFAC interpretation regarding broadcasts was reasonable). 
119 Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. § 95a (4) (2006), 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2006)). 
120 12 U.S.C. § 95a(4). Notwithstanding this legislative history, OFAC continues to 
limit some forms of collaboration with foreign publishers, including government offi-
cials from foreign nations. See Tracy J. Chin, Note, An Unfree Trade in Ideas: How 
OFAC's Regulations Restrain First Amendment Rights, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1883, 1890 (2008) 
(critiquing agency interpretations limiting collaboration with some foreign publish-
ers); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.577(a) (stating that the general license for publishing 
does not apply to publishing activities by the "Government of Cuba"); id. § 500.206(c) 
(stating that the exemption does not apply to "substantive or artistic alteration" of 
materials). 
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2. The Tariff Act and "Immoral" Materials 
Customs and immigration officials still possess broad authority 
under the Tariff Act of 1930121 to conduct border searches and to 
seize any unauthorized items of commerce.122 The Tariff Act 
expressly restricts the importation of certain "immoral" articles of 
commerce.123 The law attempts to track First Amendment doctrines 
by distinguishing between protected and unprotected materials. 
Thus, among other things the Tariff Act bans the importation of 
materials that incite insurrection, convey a true threat, constitute 
obscenity, may be used to procure an unlawful abortion, or advertise a 
lottery. 124 Pursuant to the authority granted by the Tariff Act, cus-
toms agents have seized books, newspapers, and other materials from 
journalists and authors that were deemed subversive or obscene.125 
As a manifestation of the fact that the First Amendment operates 
differently at the border, certain provisions of the Tariff Act vest 
broad discretion in the Secretary of the Treasury. For example, 
despite the import ban applicable to "immoral" and illegal items, the 
Act allows the Secretary to permit importation of "the so-called classics 
or books of recognized and established literary or scientific merit."126 
Regulations also purport to authorize the Secretary to release a book 
initially seized as "obscene" to its original consignee-if the Secretary 
is satisfied that the book is a "classic'' or has "recognized and estab-
121 19 u.s.c. §§ 1202-1681b (2006). 
122 See id. § 1305. 
123 Id. § 1305(a). 
124 Id. The prohibition reads, in relevant part: 
I d. 
All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any 
foreign country any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, 
print, picture, or drawing containing any matter advocating or urging trea-
son or insurrection against the United States, or forcible resistance to any 
law of the United States, or containing any threat to take the life of or inflict 
bodily harm upon any person in the United States, or any obscene book, 
pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, drawing, or 
other representation, figure, or image on or of paper or other material, or 
any cast, instrument, or other article which is obscene or immoral, or any 
drug or medicine or any article whatever for causing unlawful abortion, or 
any lottery ticket, or any printed paper that may be used as a lottery ticket, or 
any advertisement of any lottery. 
125 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 733. In 1973, the Supreme Court held 
that the Tariff Act was constitutional as applied to the importation of obscene materi-
als for private use. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 
139 (1973). 
126 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a). 
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lished literary or scientific merit."127 It is not clear whether, and if so, 
how often, such discretionary authority has actually been exercised. 
The "classics" provisions do not appear to have been challenged in 
any court. 
The territorial infrastructure relating to broad customs authority 
to seize certain materials remains largely intact. A1:. noted earlier, the 
Tariff Act provides ample authority to restrict the importation of ille-
gal items of commerce. Customs officials continue to search materials 
and seize illegal items at the territorial borders. However, broad 
exemptions for "informational materials" have substantially limited 
the materials subject to seizure at the borders. Of course, today much 
of this material travels across borders in digital form. This does not 
mean that it is exempt from regulation or seizure; but it has become 
far more difficult to regulate. I will consider digitization's effect on 
the territorial First Amendment in Part III. 128 
3. Border Searches and New Technologies: A First Amendment 
"Exception"? 
The era of the personal computer has raised some new concerns 
regarding the territorial First Amendment. In a globalized society, 
international travelers routinely carry computing devices, which are 
typically filled with expressive material, at the border. The question 
has arisen whether the First Amendment requires an exception to the 
broad search and seizure authority customs officials possess at the 
nation's borders. 
Ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements, such as probable 
cause and the issuance of warrants, do not generally apply to routine 
searches and seizures at the border.129 A1:. the Supreme Court has 
said, "[i]t is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the 
inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, 
its territorial integrity."130 At least since the framing of the Fourth 
Amendment, Congress has delegated broad authority to customs offi-
cials to search persons and items at the border.13I 
127 19 C.F.R. § 12.40(g) (2009). 
128 See infra Part III.A.2. 
129 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) ("The Govern-
ment's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith 
at the international border."). 
130 /d. at 153. 
131 The current version of the customs statute is expansive: 
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or 
vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters ... or 
at any other authorized place ... and examine the manifest and other docu-
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Although most of the constitutional concerns regarding border 
searches relate to the Fourth Amendment, serious First Amendment 
issues can also arise. As we have seen, information and ideas flow 
across the border in many different forms. Traditionally, this has 
included written and recorded materials. In United States v. Ramsey,132 
the Supreme Court held that the probable cause and warrant require-
ments did not apply to the opening of incoming international letter-
class mail by customs officials. 133 Such searches were deemed reason-
able merely by virtue of their location. 134 The Ramsey Court summa-
rily dismissed any First Amendment concerns, reasoning that the 
detailed regulatory restrictions on opening letter mail negated any 
concern regarding the chilling of expression. 135 "Accordingly," the 
Court said, "we find it unnecessary to consider the constitutional 
reach of the First Amendment in this area in the absence of the 
existing statutory and regulatory protection."136 
Ramsey thus declined an invitation to de-territorialize constitu-
tional scrutiny of border searches involving expressive materials. The 
invitation has recently been proffered anew-and again declined-in 
cases involving more modern forms of communication. Laptops and 
other computing devices now routinely carried by international trav-
elers contain private and expressive material including diaries, medi-
cal information, personal correspondence, and financial records. 
Travelers subjected to warrantless border searches have challenged 
the searches on both Fourth Amendment and First Amendment 
grounds. 
So far, courts have refused to recognize any First Amendment 
exception to the broad border search authority of customs and other 
officials. 137 In United States v. Ickes, 138 Mr. Ickes attempted to enter the 
United States from Canada. 139 When U.S. Customs agents searched 
ments and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and 
every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board .... 
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). 
132 431 u.s. 606 (1977). 
133 See id. at 619. 
134 See id. ("Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment, have been considered to be 'reasonable' by the single fact that the per-
son or item in question had entered into our country from outside."). 
135 Id. at 623. 
136 Id. at 624. 
137 This would be in the nature of an exception to an exception, in that the First 
Amendment would dictate that courts not follow the border search exception to the 
warrant and probable cause requirements. 
138 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
139 Id. at 502. 
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his van, they found several images of child pornography stored in 
photo albums and on Ickes's computer. 140 The court upheld the war-
rantless search of Ickes's computer under the Fourth Amendment's 
border search exception. 141 It also rejected Ickes's argument that the 
bare "reasonableness" standard was not appropriate as applied to 
"expressive" material.142 To hold otherwise, the court said, would 
"create a sanctuary at the border for all expressive material-even for 
terrorist plans."143 It would also, said the court, create "significant 
headaches" for those required to determine the scope of the pro-
posed exception. 144 "These sorts of legal wrangles at the border," the 
court said, "are exactly what the Supreme Court wished to avoid by 
sanctioning expansive border searches."145 
In United States v. Amold,146 the Ninth Circuit reached the same 
conclusion. Customs officers at Los Angeles International Airport 
examined the contents of Arnold's laptop computer without reasona-
ble suspicion.l47 After requiring Arnold to boot up the computer, 
agents clicked on two desktop folders labeled "Kodak Pictures" and 
"Kodak Memories."148 Believing that these folders contained images 
of child pornography, the agents referred Arnold to U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security and immigration officials for interrogation. 149 
Arnold, who had traveled from the Philippines, was later charged with 
knowingly transporting images of child pornography in foreign com-
merce.150 The Ninth Circuit held that reasonable suspicion was not 
required to conduct a search of Arnold's laptop at the "functional 
equivalent" of the international border.151 The court held that the 
search was not sufficiently intrusive of privacy concerns to require any 
degree of suspicion.152 With regard to Arnold's argument that the 
First Amendment required some level of suspicion prior to search, the 
140 I d. 
141 I d. 
142 Id. at 506. 
143 I d. 
144 I d. 
145 I d. 
146 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008). 
147 Id. at 1005. 
148 I d. 
149 I d. 
150 I d. 
151 See id. at 1006, 1008. The Supreme Court has stated that international airports 
are the "functional equivalent" of the border. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
u.s. 266, 273 (1973). 
152 Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009. 
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Ninth Circuit simply reiterated and adopted the reasoning of the 
Fourth Circuit in Jckes.l53 
In this context, at least, it is apparent that globalization and digi-
tization have not altered the territorial First Amendment. Expressive 
interests are enforced differently, if at all, at the territorial borders.154 
Like other border searches, warrantless and suspicionless searches of 
computing devices have been deemed valid merely by virtue of their 
location. This is so despite the fact that the search of computing 
devices is in some cases a more substantial invasion than, say, a search 
of papers or international mail. 
4. Export Administration 
A variety of technical regulations restrict the cross-border 
exchange of certain types of otherwise lawful speech and information. 
The Export Administration Act of 1979155 (EAA), a successor to ear-
lier and much more stringent Cold War export control laws, provides 
the current statutory authority for export controls on sensitive materi-
als and technologies, some of which have both civilian and military 
applications. 156 Other federal laws and regulations restrict or prohibit 
the cross-border exchange of military materials. 157 The common pur-
pose of these laws is to regulate, generally through a system of licen-
sure, any exchanges of information that could be detrimental to the 
security of the United States.158 
153 See id. at 1010; see also United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 
2008) (Callahan,J., concurring) (affirming that there is no First Amendment excep-
tion to border search authority). 
154 But seeTabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 101-02 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying 
ordinary First Amendment standards to a claim that border detention violated 
associative rights, but noting that less rigorous scrutiny may be appropriate in the 
border context). 
155 Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§§ 2401-2420 (2006)). 
156 The EAA, which originally expired in 1989, has been periodically reauthorized 
for short periods of time. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CoNG. REsEARCH SERV., THE ExPORT 
ADMINISTRATION Acr 1 (2009), available at http:/ /www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL31 
832.pdf. At other times, including currently, the export licensing system created 
under the authority of the EAA has been continued by the invocation of the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006). 
FERGUSSON, supra, at 1. 
157 The International Security Assistance and Amls Export Control Act of 1976, 22 
U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799aa-2 (2006), which is administered by the Departments of State 
and Defense, regulates this material. 
158 Cf Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915, 916-918 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding, under commercial speech standard, the application of EAA and imple-
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The EAA prohibits the sharing, without a license, of "information 
and know-how (whether in tangible form ... or in intangible form 
... ) that can be used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or 
reconstruct goods, including computer software and technical 
data."159 According to the most recent figures, there are approxi-
mately 2400 dual-use items on what is known as the "Commerce Con-
trol List," which is compiled pursuant to export control regulations. 160 
Owing to their dual-use capabilities, computers, computer technology, 
and technological data are of particular concern under the EAA and 
its implementing regulations.l61 
Under the current Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 
promulgated pursuant to the EAA, computer software, equipment, 
and technical data that have both civilian and military applications 
cannot be exported to certain countries without an export license. 162 
A similar license, known as a "deemed export" license, is required 
whenever sensitive technology is shared with foreign nationals work-
ing in U.S. schools or laboratories-apparently on the ground that 
the foreign national may return home and reproduce the technology 
there.163 In effect, the "deemed export" rule moves the territorial 
border inward and treats exchanges inside the United States as 
"exports" of restricted technology. 
The effect these licensing provisions have on cross-border infor-
mation exchange and First Amendment liberties may be relatively 
minor. Most EAR license applications are ultimately approved, and 
relatively few appear to involve the delicate First Amendment issues 
raised by the "deemed export" rules (discussed below). 164 Some spe-
cific licensing provisions have raised First Amendment issues, how-
menting regulations to a domestic corporation's provision of business data to a for-
eign organization). 
159 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415. 
160 IAN F. FERGUSSON, CoNe. REsEARCH SERV., THE ExPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT 8 
(2008), available at http:/ /www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207 /bitstreams/1671. 
pdf. 
161 See FERGUSSON, supra note 156, at 14-19. 
162 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 730.1-774.1 (2009). A separate set of regulations, the Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations, governs military technology and equipment. See 
22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-130.17 (2009). 
163 See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2 (stating that the release of technology or software to a 
foreign national in the United States can constitute a "deemed" export to the per-
son's home country). 
164 See FERGUSSON, supra note 156, at 10, 18 (noting that in 2008, officials 
approved 84% of all license applications and that in 2007, officials reviewed 1056 
"deemed export licenses," which constituted 5.4% of all submitted license 
applications). 
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ever. For example, export controls relating to technical data have 
raised concerns regarding licensure of computer code and other 
expressive technologies.165 Some of these constitutional concerns 
have been resolved or substantially ameliorated through amendment 
of the EAR. For example, earlier versions of the EAR applicable to 
source and encryption computer code were successfully challenged as 
unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.166 In response both to 
these legal challenges and international market conditions in which 
computer source code has become a significant export commodity, 
the EAR now generally permit the cross-border publication and shar-
ing of computer source code. 167 
Licensing of encryption technology has also been decontrolled 
under the EAR; today, retail encryption products and technology can 
be exported to Western countries and nongovernmental end-users 
pursuant to a general license exemption.168 The current version of 
the EAR also contains broad exemptions for "[p ]ublicly available" 
technology; software and other material that "arise[s] during, or 
result[s] from, fundamental research;" and for educational informa-
tion.169 Finally, consistent with the approach taken under other trade 
laws, the EAR generally exempt from licensure a host of "informa-
tional materials" which do not implicate national security and defense 
concerns. 170 
165 See Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REv. 889, 
905-12 (1986) (discussing First Amendment concerns with regard to federal laws reg-
ulating the export of technical data). See generally E. John Park, Protecting the Core 
Values of the First Amendment in an Age of New Technologies: Scientific Expression vs. 
National Security, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (1997) (discussing the First Amendment implica-
tions of federal export controls regarding encryption technology and other scientific 
expression). 
166 See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that source 
code is expressive and remanding for consideration in light of EAR source code 
amendments); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that source code is expressive and that the EAR constituted an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint), reh'g granted, opinion withdraum by 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
167 See 15 C.F.R. § 740.17 (authorizing the export of source code to private end-
users under license exception, but only after technical review). 
168 !d. 
169 See id. § 734.3(b) (3) (exempting "[p]ublicly available" technology and software 
that arises during or results from "fundamental research"); id. § 734.8 (defining 
"[f]undamental research"); id. § 734.9 (defining exempt "[e]ducational 
information"). 
170 Specifically, the EAR exempt the following materials: 
Prerecorded phonograph records reproducing in whole or in part, the con-
tent of printed books, pamphlets, and miscellaneous publications, including 
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Although they have liberalized and decontrolled certain aspects 
of cross-border information exchange, these EAR amendments and 
exemptions have not resolved all First Amendment issues relating to 
current export controls. 171 In particular, the First Amendment impli-
cations of the "deemed export" regulations have not been tested in 
court. 
The EAR prohibit private parties like universities and research 
laboratories from sharing information with foreign students without 
first obtaining a license from regulators. 172 To treat the sharing of 
information with resident aliens within American research and aca-
demic institutions as a restricted "export" may trench upon academic 
freedom and other fundamental First Amendment interests. The Rea-
gan administration invoked the EAR against scientists and academics 
who merely delivered academic papers to foreign audiences without 
first obtaining an export license.173 Note that the information in 
question is neither classified nor owned by the government (although 
some of it has been produced using federal funds). 174 In other con-
texts, the First Amendment would likely protect one private party 
from sharing information with another private party-even if there 
was some possibility that the information might be used for evil or 
illegal purposesP5 At the border and its "deemed" equivalent, how-
ever, First Amendment considerations may be quite different. 176 The 
newspapers and periodicals; printed books, pamphlets, and miscellaneous 
publications including bound newspapers and periodicals; children's picture 
and painting books; newspaper and periodicals, unbound, excluding waste; 
music books; sheet music; calendars and calendar blocks, paper; maps, 
hydrographical charts, atlases, gazetteers, globe covers, and globes (terres-
trial and celestial); exposed and developed microfilm reproducing, in whole 
or in part, the content of any of the above; exposed and developed motion 
picture film and soundtrack; and advertising printed matter exclusively 
related thereto. 
!d. § 734.3(b) (2). 
171 For a general discussion of the First Amendment concerns relating to export 
controls on the exchange of scientific and technical information, see Kamenshine, 
supra note 1. 
172 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b). 
173 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 741. 
174 See Kamenshine, supra note 1, at 886-90 (discussing regulation of the speech 
of private grantees under conditional grants). 
175 See, e.g., Unmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) 
(invalidating municipal ban on posting of "for sale" or "sold" signs on homeowners' 
properties, put in place to prevent so-called "white flight"). 
176 See Kamenshine, supra note 1, at 876 (arguing that regulation of the import 
and export of scientific and technological information should generally be subject to 
rational basis review). 
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territorial First Amendment may permit regulators to control certain 
information exchanges that implicate national security at the fictional 
"border" within research institutions. 177 
As in other cross-border contexts, a territorial framework contin-
ues to govern export of a variety of materials that may implicate 
national security. Export controls have been liberalized to some 
extent to allow for the sharing of nonmilitary informational materials, 
including some computer code. But export licensure provisions still 
restrict the exchange of critical digital-era information, including 
"know-how" and technical data that constitute otherwise lawful expres-
sion. Moreover, the "deemed export" rule demonstrates how the ter-
ritorial border can be redefined or manipulated to restrict otherwise 
lawful intraterritorial information exchange. 
5. Cross-Border Artistic and Educational Exchanges: The Beirut 
Agreement 
As noted, the territorial First Amendment sometimes implicates 
cross-border educational and artistic exchanges. The sharing of films, 
music, books, and other works has sometimes been restricted under 
U.S. trade laws. In 1949, the United States signed the Beirut Agree-
ment,178 a multilateral treaty intended to facilitate international dis-
semination of films and other audiovisual materials of an educational, 
scientific, and cultural character.179 Under the agreement and imple-
menting regulations, quali.:fYing materials were exempt from customs 
duties, import licenses, special rates, quantitative restrictions, and 
other costs.IB° For many domestic film distributors, these costs can 
substantially restrict the ability to place materials in foreign 
commerce. 
In order to receive the benefits provided under the treaty, distrib-
utors had to obtain a certificate from the appropriate governmental 
agency in the country of the material's origin attesting to the item's 
educational, scientific, or cultural character.181 Until 1999, when its 
177 SeeSunstein, supra note 165, at 905-12 (discussing the balance of First Amend-
ment interests and national security concerns under export controls relating to infor-
mational exchange). 
178 Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory 
Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, opened for signature July 
15, 1949, 17 U.S.T. 1578, 197 U.N.T.S. 3. 
179 See id. Congress passed an implementing statute in 1966, and formal opera-
tions under the agreement began in 1967. See Joint Resolution of Oct. 8, 1966, Pub. 
L. No. 89-634, 80 Stat. 879 (formal ratification). 
180 See Beirut Agreement, supra note 178, 17 U.S.T. at 1581-82, 197 U.N.T.S. at 6. 
181 See 22 C.F.R. § 61 (2009). 
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functions were transferred to the State Department's Bureau of Edu-
cational and Cultural Affairs (BECA), the Beirut Agreement was 
enforced by the United States Information Agency (USIA).182 The 
USIA's implementing regulations required that the agency apply a 
variety of "substantive criteria" for determining eligibility.183 One reg-
ulation provided that the agency would not certify material that 
attempted to "influence opinion, conviction or policy;" "espouse a 
cause;" or "attack a particular persuasion."184 Another provision 
denied certification to material "which may lend itself to misinterpre-
tation, or misrepresentation of the United States or other 
countries. "185 
In 1988, a federal appeals court invalidated these regulations on 
the ground that they were content-based restrictions on speech that 
did not serve any compelling government interest.186 The USIA then 
promulgated new regulations.187 Mter these too were challenged as 
violating the First Amendment, the President signed into law the For-
eign Relations Authorization Act. 188 The Act provides that the agency 
may not deny a customs exemption to materials because they advocate 
a particular position or viewpoint, might lend themselves to misinter-
pretation or to misrepresentation of the United States, are not repre-
sentative, authentic, or accurate, do not augment international 
understanding or goodwill, or are in the opinion of the agency "prop-
aganda."189 The House Report accompanying the bill explains that 
the legislation is intended to ensure that U.S. obligations under the 
Beirut Agreement "are carried out in a manner that is consistent with 
the spirit of the Agreement and with the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States."19° Current regulations still allow for 
some minimal content review of materials. For example, officials may 
deny an exemption for materials that fail to "maintain, increase or 
182 Compare 22 C.F.R. § 502.1 (1999) ("The [USIA] administers the 'Beirut Agree-
ment ofl948' ... . "),with 22 C.F.R. § 61.1 (2000) ("The Department of State adminis-
ters the 'Beirut Agreement of 1948' .... "). 
183 22 C.F.R. § 502.6 (1988). 
184 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(3) (1987) (repealed). 
185 ld. § 502.6(b) (5) (repealed). 
186 See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988). 
187 See Propaganda as Educational and Cultural Material; World-Wide Free Flow 
(Export-Import) of Audio-Visual Materials, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,753, 43,757 (Nov. 16, 
1987). 
188 Pub. L. No. 102-138, 105 Stat. 647 (1991) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2051 
(2006)). 
189 19 u.s.c. §§ 2051(1)-(5). 
190 H.R. Rep. No. 102-53, at 65-66 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 384, 
419-20. 
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diffuse knowledge" 191 or "[have] as [their] primary purpose or effect 
to amuse or entertain."192 
By signing the Beirut Agreement, the United States committed to 
facilitate cross-border exchange of artistic and educational materials. 
Although some content review is still authorized under agency regula-
tions, courts have reviewed agency viewpoint discrimination with great 
skepticism. With judicial encouragement, the political branches have 
sought to bring enforcement of the Beirut Agreement into compli-
ance with First Amendment standards. 
6. Dissemination of Foreign "Propaganda" 
As noted, during certain historical periods the United States has 
sought to erect territorial barriers to the dissemination of foreign 
ideas. This wariness with regard to foreign ideas and influences con-
tinues to be manifested in restrictions on the dissemination of certain 
foreign content inside the United States. 
For example, the Foreign Agents Registration Act193 (FARA) reg-
ulates the importation and dissemination of certain foreign books, 
films, and periodicals, including some materials not covered by 
TWEA. FARA was initially intended to restrict the importation of for-
eign political propaganda, in particular Nazi-sponsored materials. 194 
FARA does not bar dissemination of foreign material. Rather, it 
requires that foreign "agents" register with the United States Attorney 
General and file with that office any "informational materials" that are 
to be distributed for or in the interest of foreign principals. 195 
At various historical junctures, F ARA, like TWEA, was applied 
broadly to restrict the cross-border flow of informational materials. In 
the early 1980s, for example, FARA was enforced against the import-
ers of three Canadian films that concerned acid rain and the threat of 
nuclear war. 196 In an enforcement challenge brought by the films' 
distributors, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment chal-
lenge to FARA's requirement that "foreign political propaganda" be 
labeled as such prior to distribution in the United States.197 The 
Court concluded that Congress had not thereby burdened or substan-
tially chilled the domestic dissemination of foreign speech; rather, it 
191 22 C.F.R. § 61.3(b) (1) (2009). 
192 !d.§ 61.3(b)(4); see also id. § 61.3 (setting forth certification standards). 
193 22 u.s.c. §§ 611-621 (2006). 
194 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 735. 
195 22 U.S.C. §§ 612, 614; see Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 736 (describ-
ing enforcement under the Act). 
196 See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987). 
197 !d. at 480-81. 
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had "simply required the disseminators of such material to make addi-
tional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the 
import of the propaganda."I98 
Rodney Smolla, among others, has strongly assailed the Court's 
reasoning.199 He traces the "foreign political propaganda" restric-
tions to the "ugly history" of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, and 
more generally to a history of xenophobia and fear of foreign ideas.200 
But according to the Court the territorial First Amendment does not 
preclude the government from regulating, and perhaps implicitly 
commenting upon the value of, foreign speech that crosses the bor-
der. Commentators have noted, however, that FARA has been 
plagued by a variety of enforcement problems.201 Thus, it does not 
appear that FARA substantially affects distribution of foreign propa-
ganda materials in the United States. 
7. Cross-Border Contacts and Associations 
Finally, the territorial First Amendment limits the extent to which 
domestic persons may associate with foreign persons, entities, and 
organizations. In general, U.S. citizens and resident aliens have the 
right to speak to and associate with resident aliens and foreign entities 
located within U.S. territorial borders, assuming of course that such 
persons and entities are lawfully present and are not engaged in ille-
gal activity. With regard to cross-border contacts, criminal laws pro-
scribe a variety of illegal associations. As noted earlier, citizens and 
resident aliens have no First Amendment right to hear or associate in 
person with a foreign speaker who has been denied entry to the 
United States (although they have the right to receive information 
from foreign persons and organizations through other means). 202 
National surveillance programs have apparently ensnared telephone 
and other communications between domestic speakers and foreign 
contacts; however, First Amendment challenges to such surveillance 
activities have generally failed for lack of standing.2os 
198 Id. at 480. 
199 See RoDNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SociE'IY 361-67 (1992). 
200 Id. at 363-64. 
201 See Charles Lawson, Note, Shining the 'Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity' on Foreign Lob-
byists? Evaluating the Impact of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 on the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, 29 VAND.]. TRANSNAT'L L. 1151, 1164-67 (1996) (discussing FARA 
enforcement problems). 
202 See supra notes 23, 38-42 and accompanying text. 
203 See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 667-73 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the surveillance program on First 
Amendment grounds). 
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U.S. laws restrict the right to associate with foreign persons and 
entities in certain designated contexts. For example, spending condi-
tions placed on foreign aid may affect the ability of domestic persons 
and organizations to associate with foreign activists and collabora-
tors.204 U.S. law also restricts the extent to which domestic citizens 
and resident aliens may represent foreign entities and interests inside 
the United States. For example, the Foreign Missions Act205 autho-
rizes the State Department to regulate foreign missions in the United 
States and to close them if "necessary to protect the interests of the 
United States."206 The D.C. Circuit has held that U.S. citizens and 
resident aliens do not have a First Amendment speech or association 
right to represent a foreign entity on U.S. soil.2°7 The court cited 
national security and foreign policy considerations as grounds for 
granting broad deference to agency decisions regarding such foreign 
contacts.208 
The closure of a foreign mission does not restrict the ability to 
otherwise associate with foreign entities or to advocate their causes. 
However, terrorism-related laws impose substantial restrictions on 
contacts, collaboration, and cross-border advocacy. Specifically, fed-
eral laws and regulations restrict the financial and other support 
domestic persons and organizations may provide to foreign entities 
that have been designated "foreign terrorist organizations."2°9 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,210 as 
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, prohibits the provision of "train-
ing," "expert advice and assistance," "financial services," "personnel," 
and other forms of assistance to designated terrorist organizations.211 
Several courts have rejected First Amendment, vagueness, and over-
breadth challenges to the State Department's "foreign terrorist organ-
204 See DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for lnt'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 277, 282, 299 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding family planning aid restrictions that allegedly interfered 
with the right of domestic organizations to associate with foreign organizations). 
205 22 u.s.c. §§ 4301-4316 (2006). 
206 Id. § 4305(b)(3). 
207 See Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (uphold-
ing a State Department order closing a Palestinian mission). 
208 See id. at 942 ("[O]ur deference to the State Department on questions of for-
eign policy is great."). 
209 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2006). 
210 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 42, and 50 U.S.C.). 
211 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (1) (2006) (defining "material support or resources"); 
id. §§ 2339B(a) (1), (g) (4) (prohibiting the provision of various forms of "material 
support or resources" to foreign terrorist organizations). 
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ization" designations.212 Some courts have held, however, that certain 
statutory definitions of prohibited "material support" to such organi-
zations are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.213 
The government undoubtedly has the power to apply the mate-
rial support prohibitions to conduct that facilitates terrorist activity. 
But the law as written appears to go much further. Indeed, as inter-
preted by the government, the restrictions would appear to prohibit 
U.S. residents from engaging in even pure political speech-i.e., 
assisting with the filing of United Nations claims and providing train-
ing in the use of international and humanitarian law-that promotes 
lawful and nonviolent activity.2I4 
The obvious goal of the material support prohibition is to pre-
vent contacts with and assistance to foreign organizations that are a 
threat to national security. The territorial First Amendment permits 
the government to regulate foreign contacts that are intended to facil-
itate terrorist activity or pose other national security threats. Whether, 
or to what extent, it may do so by targeting the communications or 
associations themselves is an issue the Supreme Court will likely soon 
decide.215 
II. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL FIRST AMENDMENT 
The relationship between territory and the First Amendment 
extends beyond, and indeed is far more complex than, the regulatory 
concerns represented by the territorial First Amendment. Globaliza-
tion, digitization, and other social and political forces have called into 
question some longstanding suppositions about the First Amend-
ment's territorial scope or domain. As territorial borders have 
become softer in a regulatory sense, they have also begun to fade 
somewhat as markers of the First Amendment's spheres of application 
and influence. The issues addressed in this Part relate primarily to 
212 See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agencyv. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728,736-37 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (upholding OFAC designation of a group as a branch of a "Specially Desig-
nated Global Terrorist"); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 357 (4th Cir. 
2004) (upholding a conviction for materially supporting a designated foreign terror-
ist organization); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 
85 (D.D.C. 2002) (upholding the designation of a Muslim group as a foreign terrorist 
organization). 
213 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 928-31 (9th Cir. 
2009) (upholding in part and invalidating in part definitions of various forms of assis-
tance rendered to foreign terrorist organization), cert. granted sub nom., Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009). 
214 /d. 
215 See id. 
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the relationship between the First Amendment and persons or activi-
ties beyond U.S. territorial borders. This is the First Amendment's 
extraterritorial dimension. 
First Amendment norms and standards can cross borders in a 
variety of ways. For example, courts and lawmakers in countries 
outside the United States may be persuaded by and therefore adopt 
American speech principles and doctrines. 216 The process of norm 
transmission is an important aspect of the First Amendment's territo-
rial dimension, one to which I will return in Part III. This Part exam-
ines four specific ways in which U.S. officials might expand the 
influence and scope of the First Amendment. It considers efforts or 
proposals to (1) extend U.S. laws, including the statutory framework 
for protection of intellectual property, beyond U.S. borders; (2) 
shield speakers and publishers in the United States from foreign libel 
judgments obtained abroad, hence exporting First Amendment libel 
standards; (3) export First Amendment norms through regulations of 
U.S. technology companies, diplomacy, export controls, and funding; 
and (4) export the First Amendment's substantive protections to 
restrictions on speech, press, and associational activities abroad, for 
the benefit of U.S. citizens, aliens, or both. 
A. Regulating Foreign Speech 
The global scale of communications and the globalization of 
commerce have given rise to concerns regarding the extraterritorial 
reach of domestic speech laws. The once-clear line between domestic 
and foreign speech has begun to blur. Speech that is created in, and 
disseminated from, one corner of the world now routinely and effort-
lessly crosses international borders. Moreover, speech that originates 
and is disseminated in one nation can have substantial negative effects 
on persons, businesses, and organizations located across the globe.217 
To what extent can U.S. laws be applied to foreign expression? 
The digitization of expression has produced two basic schools of 
thought regarding the traditional regime of territorial governance.218 
As David Post has observed, "unexceptionalists," as the label implies, 
216 For a general consideration of the merits of First Amendment importation, see 
IMPORTING THE fiRST AMENDMENT (Ian Loveland ed., 1998) (examining freedom of 
speech in Britain, Europe, and the United States). 
217 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law 
from the Nation-State, 41 Hous. L. REv. 885, 952-53 (2004) (noting that some courts 
have been willing to "treat [trademark] doctrine more flexibly in order to accommo-
date the demands of global commerce"). 
218 The dilemma obviously extends beyond expressive concerns. Purely commer-
cial activity, for example, may similarly be affected, chilled, or deterred. 
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do not consider it at all unusual that a nation would apply its speech 
laws to content that crosses its borders-even though it crosses many 
national borders at once.219 Even in the digital era, unexceptionalists 
reason, national sovereignty encompasses the power to regulate and 
prohibit expression that crosses sovereign borders. This authority 
exists whether the expression happens to traverse borders digitally or 
by more traditional means, such as by mail. 
"Exceptionalists," by contrast, claim that the Internet has funda-
mentally altered traditional conceptions of territorial governance. 220 
Given that the Internet has essentially erased territorial borders, 
exceptionalists argue, the territorial model is no longer viable. 221 
They insist that a speaker who uses the Internet ought not to be 
forced to comply with the obscenity, libel, hate speech, and other 
speech laws in force across the globe. 222 According to exceptionalists, 
a healthy, robust, global marketplace of ideas requires that we rethink 
and indeed replace traditional territorial governance models. What is 
needed, according to some exceptionalists, is a uniform global expres-
sive standard.223 As Post says: "Global law for a global Internet."224 
This debate is hardly theoretical. For example, a French court 
ordered Yahoo! Inc. to remove Nazi paraphernalia from its U.S. serv-
ers so that French consumers would not be able to purchase them. 225 
Although the material in question was protected by the First Amend-
ment inside U.S. territory, the company was ordered to comply with 
French speech laws by making it unavailable inside France's borders.226 
The Yahoo! case highlights the burdens that may be placed on a 
speaker in the global marketplace. Without uniform laws on subjects 
such as hate speech, the speaker may be subject to liability in multiple 
jurisdictions. As exceptionalists claim, the problem is that each coun-
try may impose extraterritorial duties on speakers. As Post argues: 
"Unexceptionalist logic leads inexorably to the conclusion that Gust 
about) everything you do on the Web may be subject to Gust about) 
everybody's law."227 
219 DAVID G. PosT, IN SEARcH oF jEFFERSON's MoosE 166-67 (2009). 
220 Id. at 167-69. 
221 Id. at 167-68. 
222 Id. 
223 See id. at 170. 
224 Id. 
225 See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 
1199, 1201-04, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane) (plurality opinion) (dismissing a 
declaratory judgment action filed by Yahoo! on ripeness and jurisdictional grounds). 
226 See id. at 1201-04. 
227 PosT, supra note 219, at 167. 
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The Yahoo! case demonstrates one way in which foreign laws 
might be imported to U.S. territories. The flip side of this scenario 
involves a situation in which speakers located outside U.S. borders are 
subjected to First Amendment laws and standards. Suppose a website 
operator in Thailand produces and distributes, via the Internet, a film 
depicting animal cruelty-an activity that is perfectly legal in the juris-
diction of origin but may violate U.S. law.228 A U.S. law that criminal-
izes distribution of such depictions can presumably be applied to a 
foreign website operator, assuming she is present in the United States. 
The Thai speaker forced to comply with speech laws across the globe, 
including those in the United States, occupies essentially the same 
position as Yahoo! in its contest with French authorities. Assuming 
she cannot geographically target her content (as Yahoo! claimed it 
could not in the litigation), the speaker may be chilled from commu-
nicating the information at all or may feel compelled to alter the 
expression to meet U.S. speech standards. In this situation, the First 
Amendment has some extraterritorial impact.229 
In the above example, one might argue that there is no exporta-
tion of First Amendment standards. Mter all, the speech has entered 
U.S. borders and is subject to U.S. laws on that basis. Exportation is 
perhaps clearer when U.S. laws are applied beyond the territory of the 
United States based either upon a clear congressional intent to legis-
late extraterritorially or based upon the intraterritorial effects pro-
duced by foreign expression.230 Although there is a longstanding 
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, several 
228 The facts are similar to those in a case now pending before the Supreme 
Court. See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 220-21, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (en 
bane) (invalidating a federal law barring depictions of animal cruelty, even when the 
depictions were legal in the place or territory of origin), ccrt. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1984 
(2009); see also Adam Liptak, First Amendment Claim in Cockfight Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July 
11, 2007, at A13 (describing a lawsuit filed by a company that broadcasts cockfights 
that challenges the constitutionality of the federal law that makes it a crime to sell 
depictions of animal cruelty). 
229 Of course, the discussion assumes that the speaker will either be present within 
the United States or will have sufficient contacts with the country to make enforce-
ment of any judgment against it possible. That may not be true in many cases, partic-
ularly those involving individual speakers rather than multinational corporations. 
Moreover, U.S. speech laws are quite liberal relative to those of other countries. It 
may be a relatively rare case in which expression that is legal in its country of origin 
nevertheless violates U.S. laws. But on such occasions, like the one hypothesized, 
where U.S. law may chill or prohibit speech that is legal elsewhere, the question of the 
First Amendment's territorial domain is squarely presented. 
230 See KAL RAuSTw..A, DoES THE CONSTITUTION FoLLow THE FLAG? 111-15 (2009) 
(discussing the rise of extraterritorial application of U.S. laws). 
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federal laws, including provisions relating to employment, securities, 
and antitrust, have been given extraterritorial effect.231 
Intellectual property laws regulate and in some cases restrict the 
sharing of ideas and information. Patent, copyright, and trademark 
laws are important components of the system of free expression in the 
United States. Although they are sometimes in sharp tension with 
First Amendment principles,232 these laws seek to balance rights in 
intellectual property with the free flow of information.233 Intellectual 
property is produced and regulated in an increasingly complex inter-
national system. The sole question here is: to what extent is the 
domestic balance manifested in U.S. intellectual property laws appli-
cable beyond U.S. borders? 
For the most part, U.S. intellectual property laws remain territori-
ally bounded. Copyright and patent laws generally have no direct 
extraterritorial effect; courts have held that these laws may reach for-
eign conduct only when that conduct actively induces or contributes 
to infringements occurring within U.S. territory.234 In other words, 
there must be an act of infringement within the United States for pat-
ent or copyright laws to apply. Although some commentators have 
argued that globalization and digitization require a more liberal 
approach to territoriality, thus far a strict territorial approach has 
hrgely been retained in the copyright and patent areas.235 In contrast 
to other areas in which laws have been given express extraterritorial 
reach, the United States has sought protection for domestic copyright 
231 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, 258 (1991) (reaffirming 
the territorial presumption); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Pmperty Rights in 
an Age of Globalism, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 505, 511-13 (1997) (discussing the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws). 
232 For an analysis of the tension between intellectual property rights and the First 
Amendment, see DAVID L. LANGE & H. jEFFERSON POWELL, No LAw: INTELLEcrUAL 
PROPERlY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009). 
233 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) ("Indeed, copyright's purpose 
is to promote the creation and publication of free expression.n). 
234 See Bradley, supra note 231, at 523, 526. Patent law was given some limited 
extraterritorial application in 1984. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(£) (2006) (providing that 
exportation of unassembled components of patented invention is an infringement if 
the exporter actively induces assembly of the device outside the United States). But 
see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 457-59 (2007) (applying the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality despite the enactment of § 271 (f)). 
235 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should 
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 477-89 (2000) (considering the effect of 
the Internet on copyright and territoriality); Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in 
U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2119, 2128 (2008) (arguing that absent any 
conflict with foreign law, U.S. courts should generally be willing to enforce patents 
extraterritorially). 
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and patent interests primarily in the international arena, through the 
negotiation of treaties and agreements.236 
Trademark laws have been treated differently, however. In Steele 
v. Bulova Watch Co.,237 the Supreme Court held that the Lanham 
Act238 applied to the conduct of a U.S. citizen who had allegedly 
affixed a trademark to watches sold in Mexico.239 Some lower courts 
have not interpreted the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act 
quite so expansively. These courts apply a balancing test that consid-
ers the domestic effects of the defendant's conduct, the defendant's 
citizenship, and the likelihood of a conflict between U.S. and foreign 
intellectual property law.240 As Curtis Bradley notes, the effect of this 
ad hoc balancing is that "the extraterritorial scope of the Lanham Act 
varies to some extent from circuit to circuit."241 Bradley argues that 
the extraterritorial application of trademark law is inconsistent with 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, public international law, 
and separation of powers principles.242 Under the balancing test 
mentioned above, courts have tended to limit the extraterritorial 
reach of the Lanham Act, particularly where the plaintiff cannot 
demonstrate that the foreign activity had "substantial effects" within 
the United States.243 
In both indirect and direct ways, the First Amendment can have 
some limited extraterritorial impact on foreign expression. Foreign 
speakers, particularly those that broadcast messages on the Web, must 
at least be cognizant of U.S. and other national laws and may be sub-
ject to them. U.S. intellectual property laws have some limited extra-
territorial reach as well. The critical question with regard to 
extraterritorial application in these contexts is whether the foreign 
conduct produces some intraterritorial effects or consequences that 
the United States is entitled to prevent or punish. This "effects test," 
which permits a sovereign to regulate the conduct of persons not 
within its allegiance when such conduct has disfavored domestic 
236 RAusTIALA, supra note 230, at 121. 
237 344 u.s. 280 (1952). 
238 15 u.s.c. §§ 1051-1127 (2006). 
239 Steel£, 344 U.S. at 284-86. The defendant had purchased component parts in 
the United States and some of the watches had turned up in the United States. !d. at 
285. 
240 Bradley, supra note 231, at 528-29. 
241 Jd. at 529. 
242 !d. at 531, 546-50, 562-65. 
243 See, e.g., Int'l Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 
1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply the Lanham Act to foreign conduct 
where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate substantial effects within United States, aside 
from the earning of royalties and commissions). 
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effects, has long been used by U.S. officials and courts to reach for-
eign conduct.244 It has become increasingly salient in the globaliza-
tion era. As speech continues to become digitized, we might expect to 
see increased reliance upon the effects rationale in order to reach 
foreign speech, expressive commerce, and information sharing. 
B. Libel Tourism: Extraterritorial Application of 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
As noted, in the digital era, expression is often transmitted across 
the globe in a matter of seconds. A newspaper report on a U.S. web-
site may be distributed to a global readership. A book published in 
the United States may be sold over the Internet in countries across the 
world. Some of these publications may contain allegedly defamatory 
statements or materials. Without a uniform or global libel law, a 
speaker faces potential liability pursuant to the libel laws of every 
nation in which publication occurs. 
With increasing frequency, plaintiffs have sought and obtained 
judgments against U.S. authors under foreign libel laws that are less 
speech protective than U.S. laws. With regard to public officials and 
public figures, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan245 requires that a plaintiff 
prove that the defendant uttered false statements with "actual malice," 
which is defined as knowledge of or reckless disregard as to falsity. 246 
Owing to the United Kingdom's plaintiff-friendly libel laws, which 
place the burden on the defendant to prove truthfulness, Britain has 
been the most common forum chosen for pursuing libel suits against 
American speakers.247 Critics have labeled the practice of obtaining 
(and seeking to enforce) foreign libel judgments "libel tourism."248 
U.S. authors may have substantial grounds for concern and com-
plaint. U.K courts have entered libel judgments against foreign 
authors even when neither the authors nor the plaintiffs had particu-
larly strong contacts with the jurisdiction. In one notorious case, a 
British court entered a libel judgment against a U.S. author whose 
book was sold over the Internet in very small quantities in the United 
Kingdom. 249 This phenomenon has prompted concerns in the 
244 See RAusTIALA, supra note 230, at 102-04 (discussing the origins of the effects 
test). 
245 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
246 Id. at 279-80. 
247 See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (Sup. Ct. 
1992) (describing English libel law). 
248 See Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2008). 
249 See id. at 103-05 (affirming dismissal on the ground that the court lacked juris-
diction over the foreign judgment plaintiff). 
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United States regarding the possible chilling effects libel tourism 
might have on U.S. authors, scholars, and journalists, particularly 
those who research and write about matters of global concern. 
The issue here is similar to that raised in the Yahoo! case dis-
cussed earlier: in a globalized and digitized world, does or should the 
First Amendment shield domestic speakers from less protective 
speech laws abroad? Courts in the United States have generally 
refused to enforce foreign libel judgments on the ground that they 
contravene the First Amendment and are thus contrary to public pol-
icy.250 Although courts generally appear to assume that judicial 
enforcement of foreign libel judgments would constitute state action 
that violates the First Amendment, this premise may well be false. 251 
In any event, courts have generally refused to permit the importation 
and enforcement of foreign libel judgments. 
U.S. authors and publishers, still concerned that the foreign judg-
ments remain enforceable in the issuing country and eager in any 
event to clear their names, have obtained additional protection from 
state and federal legislatures. New York enacted the Libel Terrorism 
Protection Act,252 which provides that courts in New York need not 
recognize foreign libel judgments entered without the full protections 
granted under the First Amendment.253 Illinois has enacted a similar 
250 See Sari Louis Feraud lnt'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 478-80 (2d Cir. 
2007); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 4-6 (D.D.C. 1995); Telnikoff v. 
Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 240-51 (Md. 1997); Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 663-65 
(denying the enforcement of a British libel judgment under New York law because 
the judgment was not issued with the protections for free speech required by the U.S. 
and New York Constitutions); cf. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189-90 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding unen-
forceable a French judgment requiring a service provider to remove Nazi-related 
items from its website), rev'd on other grounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane). 
251 Scholars have disagreed as to whether the enforcement of foreign libel judg-
ments obtained in jurisdictions that do not have First Amendment-like protections 
for speakers would constitute "state action," thus arguably rendering enforcement 
unconstitutional. Compare Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY LJ. 
171, 186 (2004) (arguing that enforcement would not constitute state action), with 
Montre D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 1159, 1245 (2007) (arguing that the state action doctrine precludes 
enforcement of some foreign libel judgments). See also Molly S. Van Houweling, 
Enforcement of Foreign judgments, the First Amendment, and Internet Speech: Notes for the Next 
Yahoo! v. LICRA, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697, 703 (2003) (suggesting that enforcement 
of foreign judgments might be likened to other generally applicable laws that do not 
trigger meaningful First Amendment scrutiny). 
252 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(d), 5304(b) (8) (Consol. 2010). 
253 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b) (8). 
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law.254 Congressional proposals would provide similar, and in some 
cases additional, protections for U.S. speakers subject to foreign libel 
judgments. A bill in the U.S. House of Representatives provides that 
"a domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment 
concerning defamation unless the domestic court determines that the 
foreign judgment is consistent with the first amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States."255 Other pending House and Senate bills 
would authorize federal court jurisdiction and create a cause of action 
for a declaratory judgment and substantial money damages on behalf 
of "[a] ny United States person" sued for defamation in a foreign 
country if such speech or writing by that person "has been published, 
uttered, or otherwise disseminated in the United States."256 
Insofar as treatment of foreign judgments is concerned, the judi-
cial and legislative responses to foreign libel judgments are excep-
tional. Foreign judgments are routinely enforced in the United 
States, even where the original claim could not have been maintained, 
as a matter of law or public policy, inside U.S. territory.257 Moreover, 
under traditional conflicts principles, courts generally at least con-
sider the forum's nexus to the dispute.258 Yet the sweeping American 
approaches to foreign libel judgments would forbid enforcement even 
when the United States has a minimal territorial or other nexus to the 
dispute and the forum nation has a substantial nexus or interest. 
For example, in one case a libel judgment was obtained by an 
English citizen against a journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib-
erty.259 The comments at issue were published in an English newspa-
per.260 A Maryland court nevertheless refused to enforce the U.K. 
254 See 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/12-621 (b) (7) (2009) (amending the state's version 
of the Uniform Foreign Money:Judgments Recognition Act to provide for non-
enforcement of foreign libel judgments "unless a court sitting in this State first deter-
mines that the [foreign] defamation law ... provides at least as much protection for 
freedom of speech and the press as provided for by both the United States and Illinois 
Constitutions"). 
255 H.R. 2765, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
256 S. 449, 1llth Cong. § 3 (2009); H.R. 1304, lllth Cong. § 3 (2009). To the 
extent that the bills purport to assert jurisdiction over any person who has brought a 
foreign lawsuit against a "United States person," they may violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S. 102, 108-16 (1987) (discussing the minimum contacts necessary to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over foreign defendants). 
257 See Rosen, supra note 251, at 176-79 (noting that under conflicts-of-law and 
constitutional principles, U.S. courts almost always enforce foreign judgments). 
258 SeeREsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFUCTOFLAws§§ 149,150 (1971) (pointing 
to the place of publication and the victim's domicile, respectively). 
259 Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 232 (Md. 1997). 
260 Id. 
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW (VOL. 85:4 
judgment, because it found that Maryland and U.K defamation law 
were rooted in fundamental public policy differences concerning pro-
tection for allegedly libelous speech. 261 The only connection with the 
United States in that particular case was the fact that the judgment 
debtor had moved to the United States and had assets there.262 
Recent state laws and congressional proposals would impose flat 
bans on recognition of foreign libeljudgments, without regard to any 
balancing of the territorial and sovereign interests of the respective 
nations. The additional and substantial deterrent of private damages 
actions in some congressional proposals is clearly intended to prevent 
foreign plaintiffs from filing libel claims in forums outside the United 
States, where Sullivan's protections do not apply. Although the 
United States has a substantial interest in protecting domestic authors 
and publishers from unfair or unwarranted foreign judgments, extra-
territorial application of the First Amendment is not the only or per-
haps most appropriate means of pursuing that interest. British libel 
law may be moving closer to protective First Amendment standards. 263 
Moreover, multilateral treaties regarding enforcement of foreign 
judgments might produce a more coherent and legitimate approach 
to the treatment of foreign libel judgments by U.S. courts and 
legislatures. 
As things stand, U.S. judicial and legislative approaches to libel 
tourism may effectively render Sullivan applicable to the entire world. 
As Mark Rosen observes: "Categorically refusing to enforce such Un-
American Judgments is tantamount to imposing U.S. constitutional 
norms on foreign countries."264 The extraterritorial application of 
Sullivan may be viewed by other nations as a form of rights imperial-
ism. It also raises an important question regarding how the First 
Amendment ought to be characterized. As one commentator put it, 
the refusal to enforce foreign libel judgments (and, one might add, 
efforts to deter them in the first place) may render the First Amend-
261 ld. at 249-50. 
262 Id. at 232. 
263 See Marin Roger Scordato, The International Legal Environment for Serious Political 
Reporting Has Fundamentally Changed: Understanding the Revolutionary New Era of English 
Defamation Law, 40 CoNN. L. REv. 165, 206 (2007) (discussing recent changes in Brit-
ish defamation law); Sarah Lyall, England, Long a Libel Mecca, Reviews Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2009, at AI (reporting that British lawmakers are considering rewriting coun-
try's libel laws). 
264 Rosen, supra note 251, at 172. 
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ment "a universal declaration of human rights rather than a limitation 
designed specifically for American civil government."265 
C. Exporting First Amendment Values and Norms 
Application of domestic law to foreign speech and refusal to 
enforce foreign judgments that do not comport with the First Amend-
ment extend the reach or territorial domain of the First Amendment 
to some extent. There are several other ways in which First Amend-
ment commitments, values, and norms can be applied beyond U.S. 
territorial borders. 
The federal government may use its foreign affairs and spending 
powers to encourage other nations to adopt First Amendment princi-
ples and standards. Rather than impose First Amendment standards 
on foreign actors, the government may attempt to persuade other 
nations to adopt First Amendment norms. For example, after World 
War II the United States engaged in an ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to export First Amendment press principles across the globe 
through the United Nations.266 It has also funded the development 
and dissemination of communications technologies abroad, in the 
hope that this will facilitate free speech, association, and democratic 
governance on a First Amendment model.267 
Diplomatic activities, including application of various types of 
international pressure and persuasion, may gradually result in expor-
tation of U.S. free speech principles. For example, the United States 
may refuse to sign a treaty or multinational agreement that it deems to 
be inconsistent with First Amendment values and commitments. It 
may refuse to send representatives to international conferences whose 
underlying purpose it deems to be incompatible with First Amend-
ment norms. More affirmatively, the United States has recently articu-
lated a vision of making Internet freedom a plank of its foreign 
policy.268 Government officials and nongovernmental activists fre-
quently lobby nations to alter their speech rules. This has occurred, 
265 Craig A. Stem, Foreign Judgments and the Freedom of Speech: Look Who's Taflling, 60 
BROOK. L. REv. 999, 1036 (1994). 
266 See generally MARGARET A. BLANcHARD, ExPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
(1986). 
267 See BoLLINGER, supra note 4, at 102-03 (discussing U.S. investment in interna-
tional broadcast channels, including Voice of America); Mark Landler, U.S. Hopes 
Exports of Internet Services Will Help open Closed Societies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, at A4 
(reporting on Obarna administration's efforts to allow export of online services to 
Iran, Cuba, and Sudan). 
268 Mark Landler, Clinton Makes Case for Internet Freedom as a Plank of American For-
eign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A6. 
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for example, in response to the libel tourism phenomenon. In these 
contexts, the First Amendment may be exported through a process of 
persuasion, competition, and comparison with other speech regimes. 
U.S. officials may also seek to impose First Amendment standards 
and norms on citizens who travel and work abroad. Consider, for 
example, the Global Online Freedom Act of 2007269 (GOFA), a bill 
introduced in the House of Representatives. GOF A was a response to 
news reports that American businesses were assisting repressive 
regimes with Internet censorship and privacy violations. Yahoo! Inc. 
assisted the Chinese government in efforts to identifY (and eventually 
convict) a Chinese reporter.270 In 2006, Google announced that it 
would offer censored versions of its news and search sites in China.271 
Concerned that domestic companies were assisting the repressive Chi-
nese government, legislators sought to restrict or limit the companies' 
participation in such activities, which were obviously contrary to U.S. 
speech and privacy norms. 
GOFA sought to define certain standards that domestic compa-
nies must meet when operating in "Internet-restricting countries."272 
The law, which would authorize both civil and criminal penalties, 
would limit storage by U.S. companies of certain personal data within 
such countries and would also limit any disclosures of such informa-
tion. 273 GOF A would also establish a new agency, the Office of Global 
Internet Freedom (OGIF), within the U.S. State Department.274 The 
law would provide that any filtering or content censoring by U.S. com-
panies that is undertaken at the request of an Internet-restricting 
country must be disclosed to OGIF.275 GOFA would also prohibit U.S. 
companies from participating in any Internet jamming of U.S.-sup-
ported websites or content in these countries.276 The law would pro-
vide for a private right of action in any U.S. federal court for any 
269 H.R. 275, llOth Cong. (2007). 
270 Tom Zeller Jr., To Go Gwbal, Do You Ignore Censorship?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 
2005, at C3. 
271 See William J. Cannici, Jr., Note, The Gwbal Online Freedom Act: A Critique of Its 
Objectives, Methods, and Ultimate Effectiveness Combating American Businesses That Facilitate 
Internet Censorship in the People's Republic of China, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 123, 124-25 
(2007) (recounting events leading up to the proposal of GOFA). 
272 GOFA requires that a list be made of such countries, based upon evidence that 
"the government of the country is directly or indirectly responsible for a systematic 
pattern of substantial restrictions on Internet freedom during the preceding 1-year 
period." H.R. 275, § 105(a) (2). 
273 Id. § 201. 
274 Id. § 104. 
275 Id. §§ 203-204. 
276 Id. § 205. 
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person whose identifying information has been disclosed to an official 
in an Internet-restricting country, with the potential for recovery of 
punitive damages. 277 
The findings section of the bill indicates that the drafters and 
sponsors of GOFA perceive First Amendment freedoms as fundamen-
tal human rights, applicable without regard to territorial borders. 
GOFA's findings express support for the "fundamental human rights" 
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 278 They rely specifi-
cally upon Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,279 
which guarantees freedom to "'receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.' "280 Of course, because 
Google, Yahoo! Inc., and other technology companies are not state 
actors, the drafters could not rely directly upon the First Amendment 
in imposing GOFA's obligations and limitations. They relied instead 
on what the findings refer to as the "moral responsibility" of these 
companies to comply with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 281 But there is some indication that the drafters and sponsors 
of the law viewed the First Amendment as operating without regard to 
territorial borders. The ultimate finding states: "The United States 
supports the universal right to freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press."282 There would seem to be little doubt that the freedoms 
GOFA contemplates are commensurate with those protected by the 
First Amendment. 
These are merely some examples of the various ways in which 
U.S. officials may seek to extend First Amendment norms and princi-
ples abroad without formally applying or extending U.S. laws. Note 
that in these specific contexts the First Amendment liberties of U.S. 
citizens and resident aliens are not directly at stake. Rather, U.S. offi-
cials are seeking to extend First Amendment norms and principles 
beyond U.S. borders pursuant to a broad national policy of exporting 
liberty. They are generally acting out of concern for foreign, rather 
than domestic, speakers and audiences. 
277 !d. § 202(c). 
278 !d. § 2(1). 
279 G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 12, 1948). 
280 H.R. 275, § 2(1) (emphasis added) (quoting Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, supra note 279, art. 19, at 75). 
281 !d. § 2(13). 
282 Jd.§2(17). 
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D. Does the First Amendment Follow the Flag? 
Thus far, I have discussed rather limited exportation of First 
Amendment laws and principles, based primarily upon the domestic 
effects of foreign speech or a desire to propagate free speech norms 
beyond U.S. borders. The principal concern has been whether the 
First Amendment framework protects domestic speakers and intellec-
tual property owners from foreign laws and conduct. I have also 
raised the question whether the First Amendment might be character-
ized as a universal human right rather than a domestic limitation. In 
this section, I will consider whether the negative First Amendment 
applies beyond U.S. borders. In other words, do First Amendment 
guarantees constrain the federal government anywhere outside the 
United States?283 If so, where? And who, if anyone, may claim the 
protections of the First Amendment while abroad? 
The precise nature of the Constitution's territorial scope or 
domain has been a critical-and vexing-question since the fram-
ing. 284 The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether the 
First Amendment, in particular, applies beyond U.S. borders. Recall 
that in Haig v. Agee,285 t.he Court rather grudgingly assumed that the 
First Amendment protected a citizen's speech interests as they related 
to international travel.286 A few courts have made a similar assump-
tion with regard to U.S. press freedoms abroad.287 
283 I shall leave aside the intraterritorial concern regarding application of the First 
Amendment inside U.S. territories. In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), one of 
the so-called Insular Cases, the Court strongly implied in dictum that the First Amend-
ment applied in unincorporated territories. !d. at 277. The Insular Cases, which were 
decided in the early twentieth century, addressed whether various constitutional 
restrictions applied in the acquired territories-Florida, Hawaii, the Philippines, and 
Puerto Rico. See generally Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes, 182 U.S. 
244. 
284 See generally LoUis HENKIN, CoNSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FoREIGN 
AFFAIRS 3 (1990) (discussing "constitutional uncertainties, frictions, and dissatisfac-
tions that beset" the United States in conducting foreign affairs); NEUMAN, supra note 
44, at 44-71 (outlining the American constitutional foundation of immigration law 
and aliens' rights); RAusTIALA, supra note 230 (exploring the concept of territoriality 
and its historical evolution in American law from the founding era to the present); 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1 (2002) 
(examining the history of inherent powers over foreign affairs and the Supreme 
Court's ratification of this doctrine in late nineteenth-century decisions). 
285 453 u.s. 280 (1981). 
286 !d. at 308. 
287 See, e.g., Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 180 F. Supp. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting 
that "in an appropriate case" the press may assert a First Amendment right to gather 
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Extension of First Amendment protections to U.S. citizens 
located abroad would seem to be supported by text, theory, and pre-
cedent. The First Amendment's text does not suggest any geographic 
limitation.288 One or more of the principal justifications for First 
Amendment protection, including truth seeking,289 self-govern-
ance,290 and self-actualization,291 would seem to support the applica-
tion of First Amendment protections to citizens (and perhaps legal 
resident aliens) located abroad. Moreover, current judicial interpreta-
tions of constitutional domain strongly suggest that U.S. citizens, at 
least, do not forfeit all First Amendment protections simply by cross-
ing the territorial border. 292 
From 1891 to 1957, few questioned the Supreme Court's state-
ment in In re Ross293 that "[t]he Constitution can have no operation in 
another country."294 But after the United States became a super-
power and extended its domain to various occupied territories, the 
Bill of Rights gradually became decoupled from traditional notions of 
territorial sovereignty.295 Since the mid-1950s, the territorial domain 
of constitutional liberties, including those set forth in the Bill of 
Rights, has steadily expanded with respect to both citizens and 
aliens.296 As Kal Raustiala has observed, "legal spatiality"-the notion 
that rights vary with location-has become a disfavored concept in a 
variety of legal contexts.297 
information abroad); Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1572 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (declining to articulate the scope of any press freedoms abroad). 
288 U.S. CoNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law .... "). 
289 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
290 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GoVERN-
MENT (1948) (arguing for broad protection of the freedom of speech due to the fact 
that governments derive their power from the people). 
291 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. 
REv. 964, 966, 990-1009 (1978) (defending the self-actualization justification). 
292 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he shield 
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect [a 
citizen's] life and liberty should not be stripped away just because [the citizen] hap-
pens to be in another land."). 
293 140 u.s. 453 (1891). 
294 !d. at 464. 
295 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights 
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11, 21 (1985) (explaining the rela-
tionship between the expansion of U.S. power and the domain of constitutional 
liberties). 
296 See Kal Raustiala, The Geography of justice, 73 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2501, 2516-17 
(2005). 
297 !d. at 2504. 
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In Reid v. Covert,29B the Court rejected the idea that citizens' con-
stitutional liberties were strictly confined to U.S. territory.299 Reid 
held that the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied 
to the wife of an American serviceman accused of murder and sub-
jected to a court-martial in England. 300 A plurality in Reid dismissed 
In re Ross as "a relic from a different era."301 Justice Black, writing for 
a plurality in Reid, stated: "When the Government reaches out to pun-
ish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and 
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty 
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another 
land."302 
The most recent rejection of constitutional spatiality occurred in 
Boumediene v. Bush, 303 which held that the habeas guarantee extended 
to aliens being held beyond U.S. territorial borders.304 The 
Boumediene Court again admonished that "(e]ven when the United 
States acts outside its borders, its powers are not 'absolute and unlim-
ited' but are subject 'to such restrictions as are expressed in the 
Constitution.' "305 
Neither Reid nor Boumediene held, however, that the entire Bill of 
Rights was applicable abroad. Reid also suggested that constitutional 
guarantees do not apply with equal force when citizens were located 
outside U.S. territorial borders. In a reprise of the incorporation 
debate, some of the opinions suggested that the Bill of Rights might 
apply only partially and contingently.306 Thus, although they may be 
applicable overseas, First Amendment guarantees may be somewhat 
less robust depending on the practical necessities and contingencies 
associated with specific locations and contexts.307 In sum, following 
Reid and Boumediene, it is likely that the First Amendment applies to 
298 354 u.s. 1 (1957). 
299 See id. at 5-6 (plurality opinion) ("The United States is entirely a creature of 
the Constitution .... It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by 
the Constitution."). 
300 /d. at 18-19. 
301 /d. at 12. 
302 /d. at 6. 
303 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
304 /d. at 2262. 
305 /d. at 2259 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)). 
306 While Justice Black's opinion would have applied the Bill of Rights in toto, 
Reid, 354 U.S. at 9 (plurality opinion), Justices Frankfurter and Harlan would have 
applied the Bill of Rights more selectively, see id. at 53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
id. at 75-76 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
307 See Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that 
First Amendment guarantees are less robust in the overseas military context). 
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citizens abroad, although the extent of the application may turn on 
functional and contextual considerations.308 
This conclusion is consistent with some lower court opinions. For 
example, in a case involving speech restrictions imposed on U.S. 
soldiers located on military bases during the Vietnam conflict, the 
D.C. Circuit assumed that First Amendment protections applied at 
least to some degree.309 More recently, the Seventh Circuit applied 
First Amendment standards to a citizen's claim that travel restrictions 
had punished him for engaging in a foreign war protest.310 
The more difficult question concerns the extraterritorial applica-
tion of First Amendment guarantees to aliens abroad. 3ll Courts and 
scholars have articulated several different approaches to determining 
the territorial scope of constitutional guarantees, including the Bill of 
Rights.312 As Gerald Neuman has recently explained,313 three basic 
approaches may be gleaned from the opinions in Reid and United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,314 which held that Fourth Amendment pro-
tections did not apply to the search of an alien's property in 
Mexico.315 
One approach is to apply the Bill of Rights in foreign territories 
only to U.S. citizens and not foreign nationals.316 In Verdugo-Urquidez, 
the Court concluded that noncitizens "can derive no comfort from 
the Reid holding."317 A plurality of the Court found it significant that 
the Fourth Amendment refers to "the people"-language they con-
308 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. 
Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 259, 282 (2009). 
309 See Carlson, 511 F.2d at 1331-33 (applying time, place, and manner standards 
to soldiers' petitioning activities). 
310 See Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 559 F.3d 595, 605 (7th Cir. 
2009) (applying First Amendment standards to citizen's anti-war protest in Iraq). 
311 Again, the rights of aliens located within the United States shall be set aside as 
a matter relating to the intraterritorial First Amendment 
312 See NEuMAN, supra note 44, at 5-8 (describing the universalism, membership, 
mutuality, and global due process approaches); Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and 
the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2017, 2042-59 (2005) 
(describing various approaches to extraterritoriality). 
313 See Neuman, supra note 308, at 285. 
314 494 u.s. 259 (1990). 
315 Id. at 274-75. 
316 Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After 
Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2073, 2076-77 (2005). 
317 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270. With regard to noncitizens located abroad, 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez also indicated that extension of 
Fourth Amendment rights required some "previous significant voluntary connection 
with the United States." I d. at 271. Aliens that have entered the United States, mean-
while, are entitled to some constitutional protections-whether they have entered 
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eluded would preclude application of the Fourth Amendment to 
aliens.318 The First Amendment contains the same language, 
although one could argue that it applies only to the right of 
assembly.319 
The citizenship or membership approach has been adopted by 
some lower courts reviewing aliens' First Amendment claims. For 
example, foreign nongovernmental family planning organizations 
have challenged U.S. funding policies relating to family planning. 320 
In DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for International Development, 321 the 
District of Columbia Circuit dismissed First Amendment claims 
brought by foreign organizations that were prohibited during the 
period of any federal grant from using their own funds to perform or 
promote abortion as a method of family planning abroad.322 Such a 
restriction would violate the First Amendment if applied to domestic 
organizations. 323 
Relying primarily on the alien exclusion cases discussed in Part I, 
the court held that the foreign organizations lacked standing to assert 
any First Amendment claims because they possessed no constitutional 
rights while they were located outside the United States and were not 
within the custody or control of U.S. officials.324 Although not reach-
ing the extraterritoriality question on the merits, then:Judge Gins-
burg, after quoting the position of the Third Restatement of Foreign 
legally or not. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001) (citing cases involv-
ing the constitutional rights of aliens). 
318 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-266. Justice Kennedy disagreed that "the 
people" restricted the Fourth Amendment's geographic domain. Id. at 276 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). 
319 See U.S. CaNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble .... "). 
320 Since 1984, the United States has intermittently adopted family planning poli-
cies that restrict the use of federal aid for abortion-related counseling and services. 
See Nina J. Crimm, The Global Gag Rule: Undermining National Interests by Doing unto 
Foreign Women and NGOs What Cannot Be Done at Home, 40 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 587, 
592-608 (2007) (describing the background of the abortion "global gag rule"). 
Courts have generally upheld the policy against constitutional attacks by domestic 
organizations, reasoning that the federal government may insist pursuant to its spend-
ing power that organizations not fund abortion-related services with federal funds. 
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 915 F.2d 59, 
65 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding federal anti-abortion aid policy). 
321 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
322 Id. at 278. 
323 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (invalidating 
rule that conditioned federal funding on the speakers' agreement not to editorialize, 
even with private funds). 
324 DKT Mem'l Fund, 887 F.2d at 285. 
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Relations Law of the United States325 that constitutional rights apply 
regardless of location, stated in her partial dissent that she "would 
hesitate long before holding that in a United States-foreign citizen 
encounter, the amendment we prize as 'first' has no force in court."326 
A more functional and flexible approach, posited in concur-
rences by Justices Harlan and Frankfurter in Reid, and echoed by Jus-
tice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, would 
base extraterritorial application of constitutional liberties, such as 
those in the First Amendment, on contextual matters, such as "the 
particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible 
alternatives which Congress had before it."327 This functional 
approach gained additional currency in Boumediene, which held that 
the writ of habeas corpus extended to alien detainees being held at 
Guantanamo, a territory under the control of the United States but 
over which it did not exercise sovereignty.328 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Kennedy applied a multifactor approach similar to that articu-
lated in the Reid concurrences to determine the scope or domain of 
the habeas guarantee. The relevant factors included the nature and 
degree of control the United States exercises over the territory in 
question, the importance of the writ itself, the status of the detainees, 
the location of the arrests and detentions, and any practical obstacles 
to administration of the writ. 329 
A third approach to extraterritoriality is worth mentioning. 
Some justices and commentators favor a "mutuality of obligation" 
approach, which essentially links extraterritorial enjoyment of consti-
tutional liberties with the assertion of an obligation to obey U.S. 
law.330 This approach, which has never commanded a majority of the 
Court, would extend most protections of the Bill of Rights-presuma-
bly including those in the First Amendment-to both citizens and 
325 REsTATEMENT (THIRD) oF FoREIGN RElATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES§ 721 
(1987). 
326 DKT Mem'l Fund, 887 F.2d at 308 (Ginsburg,]., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
327 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(highlighting the impracticability of applying the warrant requirement to a search 
conducted by U.S. officials in Mexico). 
328 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). 
329 !d. at 2244, 2255, 2259. 
330 Neuman, supra note 316, at 2077. 
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noncitizens, wherever located, if they are under U.S. control or sub-
ject to U.S. laws.331 
Under current approaches to constitutional domain, it is likely 
that citizens enjoy at least some limited First Amendment protections 
when outside U.S. territorial borders. Whether First Amendment 
guarantees follow the flag more generally remains an open question. 
Mter Boumediene, it is at least plausible to argue that the First Amend-
ment protects aliens abroad in some circumstances. In order to make 
the argument for extraterritorial application stronger, however, some 
theoretical groundwork must be laid. This theoretical gap will be 
addressed in greater detail in Part III. 
III. OuR LEss TERRITORIAL, AND MoRE CosMOPOLITAN, 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment remains territorial in certain traditional 
respects. Borders continue to serve as important markers of the 
domain of free speech, press, and other First Amendment guarantees. 
But the First Amendment has become far less territorial at, and per-
haps even beyond, the nation's borders. As a result oflegislative, reg-
ulatory, judicial, political, and social changes, the First Amendment is 
becoming more cosmopolitan in character and orientation. Political 
and judicial interpretations of the First Amendment have become less 
insular in nature and more facilitative of cross-border information 
flow. Owing to digitization and globalization, the First Amendment is 
part of a renewed and vigorous international dialogue regarding free-
dom of information. In short, de-territorialization has rendered the 
boundaries and domain of the First Amendment less certain. 
There are, however, various obstacles to further movement in this 
more cosmopolitan direction.332 These include fundamental interests 
relating to state sovereignty, diplomatic limitations, and theoretical 
gaps regarding the justification for a more robust or expansive extra-
territorial First Amendment. Moreover, we ought to consider how 
cosmopolitanism might bend territorial borders in the opposite direc-
tion. Importation of foreign speech standards and norms may ulti-
mately pose some threat to the First Amendment's intraterritorial 
331 See Verdu~Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (reasoning that 
when the United States imposes obligations on foreign nationals to obey its laws, the 
government is obligated to respect rights). 
332 L have attempted in this Article to describe the present-day relationship 
between territory and the First Amendment. I take no normative position with regard 
to the value of open borders or the diminishing salience of territoriality. Rather, I 
seek here only to assess the prospects for further liberalization of the territorial First 
Amendment and expansion of the First Amendment's territorial domain. 
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domain, thus rendering the First Amendment cosmopolitan in the 
sense that it is subject to foreign influences. 
A. Soft Borders, Cross-Border Information Flow, and Sovereignty 
As we have seen, the territorial framework that governs cross-bor-
der information exchange, which was developed at the founding and 
fortified by twentieth century war and ideological conflicts, remains 
largely intact today. But as a result of legal liberalization and digitiza-
tion, U.S. borders have become appreciably "softer" barriers to the 
cross-border exchange of persons, ideas, and information. This soft-
ening of U.S. borders implicates, but does not threaten to destroy, 
U.S. sovereignty. De-territorialization is by no means destined to con-
tinue. But there are many forces that will likely continue to push the 
First Amendment in a more cosmopolitan direction. 
1. Legal and Regulatory Liberalization 
The core of the territorial First Amendment has been remarkably 
stable during the past century. As discussed in Part I, aliens still have 
no constitutional right of ingress. U.S. citizens possess only a limited 
right to travel for expressive purposes-a liberty that may be denied 
for national security or foreign policy reasons. Federal officials retain 
the same expansive border search authority granted by the very first 
Congress. By virtue of their location, searches and seizures of expres-
sive materials are considered presumptively reasonable at the border 
and its functional equivalent. Finally, U.S. law continues to restrict 
certain cross-border contacts in the name of national security. 
These and other basic territorial limitations have been with us 
time out of mind. Owing to their centrality to state sovereignty and 
territorial governance, it is perhaps no surprise that these aspects of 
the territorial First Amendment have not yet yielded to the forces of 
modernization. That does not mean, of course, that the First Amend-
ment cannot play a more prominent role in opening borders to cross-
border travel and protection of informational materials at the border. 
In any event, today cross-border information exchange is subject to 
fewer restrictions than perhaps at any time in the nation's history. 
Legal and regulatory liberalization, along with the rapid digitization 
of expression, has facilitated cross-border exchanges, information 
flow, and cultural mixing. Territorial borders have been transformed 
from hard to relatively soft barriers. 
Legal liberalization actually began in the late 1950s, when the 
Supreme Court first held that the right of a citizen to travel abroad 
could not be denied under existing passport laws and regulations 
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based solely upon an applicant's ideology.333 In 1965, the Court held 
that citizens had a right under the First Amendment to receive infor-
mation, including communist political propaganda, from foreign 
sources. 334 In these decisions, the Court signaled that a policy of strict 
isolationism with respect to foreign ideas was inconsistent with Fifth 
and First Amendment values. 
These were hopeful signs that America was shaking off its insular 
past. As we have seen, however, the federal government continued in 
ensuing decades to restrict cross-border informational exchange 
(based in many cases on the content of the materials) and immigra-
tion (including on purely ideological grounds). But as discussed in 
Part I, as a result of legislative amendments, changes to executive 
enforcement policies, and some court decisions during the 1990s, a 
broad category of "informational materials" were eventually exempted 
from content-based territorial regulations. In addition, travel and 
trade regulations were substantially liberalized by exempting or licens-
ing journalistic, academic, artistic, and other core First Amendment 
pursuits. 335 Some longstanding travel and trade embargoes have been 
lifted or moderated. At this moment, there is even substantial politi-
cal support for lifting travel restrictions that have prohibited cross-bor-
der exchanges with Cuba for many decades. Legislators and 
regulators have also substantially amended cross-border trade provi-
sions in an effort to facilitate scientific and educational information 
sharing. 336 As a result, the categories of materials subject to territorial 
restrictions have been steadily shrinking. 
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. officials have also relied less 
on ideology as a basis for cross-border regulation. Decreased reliance 
on ideological exclusions has primarily been the result of political 
rather than judicial decisions. Federal laws and regulations expressly 
prohibit officials from basing certain immigration and regulatory deci-
sions solely upon viewpoint or ideology.337 To be sure, the executive 
continues to maintain that the First Amendment does not prohibit 
exclusion of aliens based solely upon their beliefs or associations. 
However, no presidential administration has expressly invoked such 
authority since the 1980s. This is truly remarkable, particularly in 
light of the fact that some Western democracies publicly trumpet ide-
333 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (concluding that the passport 
laws did not delegate to the Secretary the power to withhold passports based on 
beliefs or associations). 
334 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). 
335 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
336 See supra Parts l.C.4-5. 
337 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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ological exclusions as a means of signaling their disapproval of certain 
beliefs.338 In sum, ideology has played a declining role at the nation's 
borders during the past few decades. 
Although many significant amendments of territorial laws and 
regulations resulted from political decisions, courts have played at 
least a minor role in softening U.S. border controls. Some laws and 
regulations were amended in response to particular judicial deci-
sions.339 To be sure, there has been no sea change in the deferential 
manner in which courts review territorial policies relating to cross-bor-
der exchanges that touch upon foreign affairs, national security, and 
immigration. The First Amendment still applies differently at the bor-
ders (and their functional equivalents) than it does intraterritorially. 
Nevertheless, beginning in the late 1980s, some courts began to 
acknowledge that speech, association, and other First Amendment 
guarantees were not isolated domestic concerns. The notion that the 
First Amendment does not apply at all, or applies with only minimal 
force, at and beyond our borders is not as dogmatically accepted by 
courts today as it was in the years leading up to globalization. Further 
"domestication" of the First Amendment scrutiny applied to remain-
ing cross-border restrictions may lead to even greater liberalization of 
cross-border information exchange.340 
The gradual softening of U.S. borders did not take place in isola-
tion or result solely from domestic concerns. It was the product of 
what one scholar has referred to as "a growing consensus in the com-
munity of states to lift border controls for the flow of capital, informa-
tion, and services and, more broadly, to further globalization."341 
New threats arising from cross-border exchanges, including terrorist 
activity and financial misconduct, have created additional regulatory 
challenges. But they do not appear to have undermined or elimi-
nated the basic consensus, at least among liberal constitutional 
democracies, that cross-border information exchange ought to be 
encouraged and facilitated. 
Border softening by means of legal and regulatory liberalization 
appears likely to continue on several fronts. As mentioned, Congress 
may soon revise or repeal travel restrictions that affect cross-border 
expression, inquiry, and association.342 The Supreme Court has been 
338 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
339 See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating 
content-based customs exemptions regulations). 
340 See generally Roth, supra note 19, at 257 (urging "domestication" of limits on 
citizens' participation in foreign affairs). 
341 SASKIA SASSEN, LosiNG CoNTROL? 59 (1996). 
342 See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
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asked to invalidate or at least narrow federal laws that limit the provi-
sion of basic advice and assistance to certain foreign organizations.343 
The nation's cross-border trade regulations have also come under 
increasing scrutiny by lawmakers and regulated industries. Owing to 
concerns regarding U.S. competitiveness in global markets, high-tech 
and other industries have lobbied aggressively for further liberaliza-
tion or elimination of various trade restrictions, including the 
"deemed export" rules discussed in Part 1.344 New threats or foreign 
policy initiatives may result in some tightening of border controls. 
But in an increasingly globalized commercial and political market-
place, hard territorial borders will likely be increasingly unsustainable. 
If not fully destroyed, the "nylon curtain"345 that once hung over 
U.S. borders now lies substantially in tatters. Our borders are cer-
tainly not open, in the sense that persons, information, and materials 
may enter without limitation. Although fear of foreign persons and 
ideas has dissipated, it remains part of the First Amendment's territo-
rial framework to some degree. Nor is it the case that the First 
Amendment applies with equal force at national and international 
borders as it does within the United States. The First Amendment will 
likely never be post-territorial in that broad sense. But as a legal or 
formal matter, U.S. borders are generally more open to expression, 
informational exchange, and a diversity of ideologies and viewpoints 
than they have ever been. Although many of the liberalizing decisions 
of the past few decades have been political rather than judicial or con-
stitutional, most are not likely to be reversed. In addition to serving 
U.S. commercial interests, de-territorialization is consistent with U.S. 
international obligations to guarantee the free flow of information 
without regard to frontiers. 
2. Digitization and Territoriality 
The liberalization of cross-border information exchange is not 
solely the product of legal and regulatory amendments. As a formal 
matter, the United States still purports to control information flow at 
its borders. As a practical matter, however, the digitization of speech 
and communication technologies like the Internet pose substantial 
343 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir. 
2009), ccrt. granted sub nom., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 48 
(2009). 
344 See supra notes 162-77 and accompanying text; see also Cornelia Dean & Wil-
liam]. Broad, Obama Is Urged to open High-Tech Exports, N.Y. TIMES, jan. 9, 2009, at A12 
(reporting that the National Academy of Sciences is concerned that expon and immi-
gration controls are harming American innovation and economic competitiveness). 
345 See Neubome & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 719. 
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challenges to the territorial model of information control. It is one 
thing to prevent the entry of harmful persons, packages, and other 
tangible materials into the United States. It is quite another to stop 
bits and bytes at territorial borders. 
Indeed, some scholars have claimed that digitization and the 
Internet will eliminate territorial sovereignty, and with it, territorial 
control of cross-border information flow. 346 As noted earlier, these 
exceptionalists view the Internet as a space that is not subject to tradi-
tional claims of territorial sovereignty.347 In their view, all law that 
applies to Internet communications and transactions is essentially 
post-territorial. Skeptics of the post-territorial thesis argue that digi-
tization has not altered territorial governance in general, or the terri-
torial First Amendment. 348 
The truth lies somewhere in the middle of these extreme posi-
tions. Insofar as speech and association are concerned, digitization 
has not eliminated the territorial First Amendment. The United 
States continues to monitor and sometimes block cross-border 
exchanges, particularly those that implicate national security. 349 This 
occurs regardless of the form or means of communication. As well, 
some contacts and collaborations are primarily physical in nature; in 
these instances, virtual contact and information exchange are simply 
not adequate substitutes. Still, these instances are increasingly the 
exception rather than the norm. In general, the migration of human 
contact and information exchange to virtual spaces has significantly 
undermined the traditional territorial approach to regulating speech, 
press, and association. 
Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu have argued that while digitization 
and the Internet have altered the methods by which governments con-
trol cross-border expression and informational exchange, they have 
not brought about the demise of territorial governance itself. 350 Gold-
smith and Wu argue that far from being a borderless space, the 
346 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1372 (1996) ("[E]fforts to control the flow of electronic 
information across physical borders-to map local regulation and physical bounda-
ries onto Cyberspace-are likely to prove futile ... ."). 
347 See PosT, supra note 219, at 166-69 (distinguishing between "unexceptional-
ists," who argue that Internet transactions are subject to traditional territorial regula-
tion, and "exceptionalists," who argue that the Internet is a distinct space not subject 
to traditional territorial rules). 
348 See GoLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 49-65; see also Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1212-50 (1998) (challenging regulation 
skeptics). 
349 See supra Part I.C.4. 
350 See GoLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 70. 
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Internet has developed such that geography and place (location) 
remain critical to the regulation of cross-border expression. 351 Their 
central claim is that governments continue to regulate speech, infor-
mation, and commerce territorially, although they now do so by focus-
ing on the activities of local "intermediaries" like Internet service 
providers, search engines, and browsers within sovereign territories.352 
Thus, although U.S. regulators and officials can neither see individual 
communications as they come across the border, nor directly control 
the foreign originators of many of these communications, Goldsmith 
and Wu argue that they can effectively regulate transactions and 
expression by controlling the domestic intermediaries over which they 
exercise regulatory authority.353 Further, as they always have, officials 
can target individuals within their borders to influence the supply of, 
and demand for, offending commerce and expression.354 
According to Goldsmith and Wu, the transmission of digitized 
speech via the Internet has merely prompted officials to shift their 
regulatory focus from the international border to domestic loca-
tions. 355 They observe that place or location still matters to cross-bor-
der exchanges, in the sense that websites often inquire where users 
are located in order to provide specialized services or appropriate lan-
guages. 356 Similarly, they note that "the efficacy of Internet communi-
cations depends on the real-space location of both data and the 
underlying Internet hardware through which the data travel."357 Con-
trary to predictions that distance has been vanquished by a borderless 
cyberspace, Goldsmith and Wu point out that Internet efficacy, 
whether in terms of communication or commerce, depends on sub-
stantial concentrations of resources and people in real physical 
places.358 
Goldsmith and Wu concede that a domestic enforcement strategy 
cannot prevent all harmful or illegal digitized speech from crossing 
351 See id. at 62-63 ("[G]eography remains crucially important, especially in the 
Internet era."). 
352 See id. at 68-72 (explaining the regulation of Internet sources, intermediaries, 
and targets). 
353 !d. at 70. 
354 See id. at 79-80 (discussing the strategy of targeting individuals). 
355 See id. at 65-85. 
356 !d. at 49. 
357 !d. at 54; see SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RiGHTS 343 (2006) (arguing 
that new communications technologies "will not inevitably globalize users and elimi-
nate their articulation with particular localities, but they will make globality a resource 
for these users"). 
358 GoLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 56-58. 
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territorial borders.359 This is obviously also true of the more tradi-
tional territorial regulatory model described in Part I. Indeed, it may 
be that more traditional border control enforcement strategies are less 
effective than those described by Goldsmith and Wu. In some cases, 
such as export controls on dual-use materials, the penalties for non-
compliance may be substantial enough to have a significant deterrent 
effect. But in other contexts, including enforcement of prohibitions 
on the importation of obscene materials, a territorial approach seems 
almost futile in the digital era.360 Ultimately, Goldsmith and Wu 
claim that domestic enforcement strategies will "succeed [ ] by lower-
ing the incidence of prohibited activities to an acceptable degree."361 
The claim is difficult to assess empirically; among other things, the 
authors do not suggest how we might quantify or prove an "acceptable 
degree" of deterrence. 
In any event, note that according to Goldsmith and Wu's 
account, it is clear that territorial borders themselves have become less 
salient features of the regulation of cross-border exchanges. The 
domestic enforcement strategy is not based primarily upon preventing 
transmission of illegal or harmful content across the border. Borders 
themselves remain salient in the regulatory sense, but only insofar as 
one conceives of them as having been pushed inward to intraterrito-
rial locations over which some sovereign exercises territorial con-
trol.362 In many circumstances, the foreign speaker's content will 
actually reach its intended audience. Rather than suppressing con-
tent at the border by means of a national filter or some other techno-
logical mechanism, most governments will be forced to rely upon ex 
post measures geared toward shutting down intermediaries and 
preventing future dissemination. 363 
It is not entirely clear that regulation that occurs some place 
other than the physical border ought to be described as "territorial." 
Goldsmith and Wu focus on the domestic effects of the expression, 
which clearly fall within the territorial sovereignty of the recipient 
359 !d. at 81. 
360 Goldsmith and Wu concede that regulation will be imperfect for any number 
of reasons, including the size of the nation, the evasive actions of intermediaries, and 
the unwillingness of some countries (like the United States) to regulate for fear of 
suppressing legal speech or conduct. !d. at 81-84. 
361 !d. at 81. 
362 Cf Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. CIV. 
RTs. & CIV. LIBERTIES 165 (2007) (discussing shifting concepts of the territorial bor-
der with regard to immigration enforcement). 
363 See GoLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 92-95 (describing China's very elabo-
rate territorial cyber-barriers). 
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nation. U.S. officials have used this conception of territorial sover-
eignty to regulate everything from trademark violations, to sharing 
computer code, to terrorist financing of foreign entities. Perhaps we 
must reconceptualize the "territorial border" to account for new cir-
cumstances. In the immigration context, for example, the "border" is 
treated as a flexible concept that does not necessarily comport with 
cartographic facts. 364 Thus, immigrants who have already crossed the 
physical border may be treated as ifthey are still situated at the inter-
national border. 
Similarly, digitized expression and information that has in fact 
already crossed international borders undetected may be viewed as 
not legitimately present. This sort of conceptual manipulation masks 
a significant territorial fact: namely, that borders can no longer func-
tion as relatively hard funnel points for cross-border expression. Mod-
em delivery systems generally bypass or ignore borders, or speech is 
there so fleetingly that it cannot be controlled at the moment of entry. 
In sum, although unexceptionalists are correct that, as both a legal 
and practical matter, nations retain territorial sovereignty despite digi-
tization, exceptionalists are also correct that the Internet has under-
mined traditional territorial regulation of cross-border information 
flow. 
In the digitized environment, speakers and speech readily cross 
territorial borders. Along with legal and regulatory liberalization, the 
digitization of speech has fundamentally altered the scope of the First 
Amendment by reducing governmental power to bar information and 
ideas at the nation's territorial borders. Cross-border communication 
and receipt of foreign information have in some respects been unal-
terably de-territorialized. 
3. Cross-Border Information Flow and "Interdependence 
Sovereignty" 
Controlling cross-border information flow is an aspect of state 
sovereignty. Some might be concerned that a loss of territorial con-
trol implies or indicates a loss of sovereignty. Sovereignty concerns 
help to explain why the executive refuses to disclaim the power of 
ideological exclusion, and why laws and regulations continue to 
require licensure of certain types of cross-border speech and contacts. 
As the Supreme Court has said, "[i]t is axiomatic that the United 
States, as a sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a par-
amount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity."365 There may_ 
364 See Shachar, supra note 362, at 166. 
365 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004). 
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indeed be significant costs associated with a less territorial First 
Amendment, among them the cross-border transmission of illegal and 
harmful content. But as the events of the past two decades have 
demonstrated, the waning of the territorial First Amendment does not 
inexorably threaten U.S. sovereignty. Further liberalization of cross-
border speech and association ought not to be rejected on sovereignty 
grounds. 
Stephen Krasner describes the ability "to regulate the flow of 
goods, persons, pollutants, diseases, and ideas across territorial 
boundaries" as "interdependence sovereignty."366 In Krasner's typol-
ogy, this concept of sovereignty is distinct from its domestic, interna-
tional (legal}, and Westphalian meanings.367 As Krasner notes, some 
commentators view the loss of border control occasioned by globaliza-
tion as a loss of sovereignty. 368 Krasner agrees that loss of such control 
might affect domestic sovereignty, in the sense that "[i]f a state cannot 
regulate what passes across its borders, it will not be able to control 
what happens within them. "369 He is justifiably skeptical, however, 
that globalization has opened national borders to such an extent that 
states have been compromised or unduly strained.370 In any event, 
Krasner claims that a loss of interdependence sovereignty does not 
necessarily compromise legal or Westphalian sovereignty. As he puts 
it: "Rulers can lose control of transborder flows and still be recognized 
and be able to exclude external actors."371 
The United States has not generally lost control over cross-border 
movement and information exchange. It will, at a minimum, con-
tinue to enforce some border controls in order to ensure domestic 
security. While the Constitution protects First Amendment liberties, 
"it is not a suicide pact."372 But such concerns do not necessarily war-
rant a strong territorial First Amendment. Although territorial bor-
ders are much softer than they were a mere two decades ago, the 
United States has not suffered any fundamental diminution in inter-
national status or domestic order. 
U.S. "interdependence" sovereignty has been diminished some-
what, both voluntarily through legal liberalization and as a function of 
technological bypasses of traditional border controls. But a less terri-
torial First Amendment, one characterized by borders that are gener-
366 See KRAsNER, supra note 25, at 12. 
367 See id. at 9-25 (discussing four meanings of sovereignty). 
368 !d. at 12. 
369 !d. at 13. 
370 !d. 
371 !d. 
372 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
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ally open, ought not to be rejected based upon fears that it portends 
the demise of U.S. sovereignty. 
B. Expansion of the First Amendment's Territorial Domain 
There are other important respects in which the First Amend-
ment has become less territorial. As we saw in Part II, officials have 
sought through various means to export the First Amendment as a 
global norm or universal guarantee. These efforts have included 
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws to foreign speech; prohibitions 
on domestic enforcement of foreign libel judgments; and foreign 
affairs funding, diplomacy, and proposed limits on the information 
activities of U.S. workers abroad. Some of the First Amendment's sub-
stantive guarantees might also be interpreted to apply to both citizens 
and aliens abroad. 
Further expansion of the First Amendment's extraterritorial 
domain will be difficult to achieve. Exportation of First Amendment 
standards, values, and norms may conflict with the sovereign interests 
of other states. Thus the United States cannot export its First Amend-
ment regime by simple decree. Moreover, limited extraterritorial 
application of U.S. trademark and other speech laws will likely have 
little effect on the First Amendment's general domain. Finally, 
although there is some jurisprudential support for extraterritorial 
application of the First Amendment's negative limitations, there are 
several practical and theoretical obstacles to such an expansion. If the 
First Amendment's territorial domain is to expand further it will likely 
be as a result of funding and regulatory decisions, along with the 
more gradual processes of norm transmission and internationalism. 373 
As discussed below, however, some worry that these processes may 
result in a transnational First Amendment that is more cosmopolitan 
in the sense that its substantive standards are influenced by importa-
tion of foreign speech regimes. In the meantime, constitutional 
democracies will continue to afford different levels of protection to 
speech, privacy, press, and association. 374 
373 See generally Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 
VA. J. lNT'L L. 985, 988-95 (2009) (discussing top-down and bottom-up processes 
impelling globalization). 
374 For a comparative analysis of speech guarantees in several constitutional 
democracies, see generally RoNALD]. KRoTosZVNSKl, JR., THE. FIRST AMENDMENT IN 
CRoss-CuLTURAL PERSPECTIVE ( 2006). 
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1. Exporting First Amendment Laws, Norms, and Standards 
The United States currently engages in a number of activities that 
are explicitly designed to expand the First Amendment's territorial 
domain.375 These range from extraterritorial application of trade-
mark laws, to routine diplomacy, to strict forms of libel protectionism. 
As a result of these efforts, the First Amendment is already extraterri-
torial to a certain extent. There are, however, serious obstacles to fur-
ther expanding its domain through mechanisms of exportation. 
Let us begin with perhaps the least effective means of exporting 
the First Amendment. Efforts to prevent domestic entities and their 
employees from assisting repressive states are intended to project First 
Amendment norms beyond U.S. territory. Recall, for example, that 
GOF A included an express finding that freedom of speech is a univer-
sal human right. 376 But measures like GOFA, if indeed they are ever 
enacted, will not prevent foreign authorities from erecting and 
enforcing territorial information barriers. As the situation in China 
demonstrates, a sovereign intent on erecting such barriers will find 
other means of doing so. Congress can at least ensure that U.S. capi-
tal does not contribute to foreign censorship. And it can signal its 
strong commitment to freedom of information through foreign pol-
icy, funding decisions, and diplomacy. In this sense, measures like 
GOFA are strong political statements that the U.S. views First Amend-
ment guarantees as global human rights. But by themselves, they will 
likely not expand the First Amendment's territorial domain. 
As discussed in Part II, extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. laws 
may have a limited impact on foreign speech. Like other nations, the 
United States regulates many types of foreign conduct on the ground 
that such conduct causes substantial harmful effects within U.S. terri-
tory. Speech is no exception to this general regulatory approach. But 
for substantive, jurisdictional, and technological reasons, effects-based 
regulation is not likely to result in any significant exportation of First 
Amendment standards. U.S. laws are generally more liberal than for-
eign speech laws. Instances in which foreign speech will be protected 
abroad but proscribed in the United States will thus be relatively rare. 
In jurisdictional terms, U.S. laws can only be applied to foreign speak-
ers who have sufficient domestic contacts with the United States. 
Thus, the lone cyber-pamphleteer need not be terribly concerned 
about the reach of U.S. speech laws. Finally, foreign speakers are 
375 See supra Part II. 
376 See Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, llOth Cong. § 2 (2007). 
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increasingly able, through geographical identification technologies, to 
limit the geographic distribution of their Internet communications.377 
As we have seen, U.S. intellectual property laws also have some 
extraterritorial reach.378 Thus far, however, only trademark laws have 
been given any extraterritorial effect-an apparent anomaly that 
some lower courts have responded to by generating balancing tests 
that limit trademark's extraterritorial application.379 There does not 
appear to be any current legislative or judicial agenda to extend the 
U.S. intellectual property regime to foreign territories. Although 
some commentators decry the rigid territorialism of intellectual prop-
erty laws, extraterritorial expansion in this area will likely occur, if at 
all, as a result of the negotiation of treaties rather than through extra-
territoriality.380 Unilateral expansion of the unique U.S. balance with 
regard to intellectual property and free speech faces numerous diplo-
matic and international hurdles. 
The drive toward First Amendment globalism has been somewhat 
more successful with regard to U.S. libel law. As discussed in Part II, 
foreign libel tourism has been met in the United States by a form of 
reactive libel protectionism. Contrary to settled principles of foreign 
judgment recognition, courts have refused to enforce foreign libel 
judgments and legislators have enacted protectionist laws that deny 
any legal force to such judgments. Libel protectionism effectively sup-
plants the speech laws and policies of other states, giving the First 
Amendment "a kind of global constitutional status."381 
Of course, plaintiffs may still obtain and enforce libel judgments 
under the laws of foreign forums. Foreign states may also respond 
with anti-anti-libel tourism laws that prohibit domestic courts from giv-
ing legal effect to U.S. decrees. Insofar as domestic defendants are 
concerned, libel protectionism shields U.S. assets by attaching the New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan regime to foreign judgments. But in the 
long run, meaningful protection from foreign libel laws will only 
result from foreign regimes amending their libel laws. To be sure, the 
passage of protectionist U.S. laws may play some role in ultimately 
defeating libel tourism. The U.S. response to libel tourism has placed 
significant pressure on British officials to shift the nation's libel stan-
377 See GoLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 59-62 (discussing geographical identifi-
cation technologies). 
378 See supra notes 232-44 and accompanying text. 
379 See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text; see also RAuSTJALA, supra note 
230, at 111 (noting that intellectual property law remains "resolutely territorial"). 
380 See RAusTIALA, supra note 230, at 121 (noting that the United States has not 
sought changes in the copyright laws of foreign nations via extraterritoriality). 
381 GoLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 161. 
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dards toward the Sullivan regime. Indeed, there are signs that Parlia-
ment may modify British libel law in response to concerns regarding 
libel tourism.382 In the community of states, however, the process of 
First Amendment norm transmission will involve persuasion rather 
than dictation.383 If it is to occur at all, First Amendment globalism 
will result from diplomacy, contacts among judges and lawyers of vari-
ous nations, transnational processes, and the work of nongovernmen-
tal organizations. 384 
Even assuming the First Amendment gains some foreign ground, 
it will likely not be the only speech regime that will experience territo-
rial expansion. In the digital age the laws of most nations may have 
some extraterritorial force or effect.385 As we saw in Part II, Yahoo! 
Inc. ultimately yielded to the judgment of a French court applying 
French law to its activities in the United States. As the Internet 
increases cross-border effects, it will also increase the competition 
among free speech laws and principles. As discussed below, the First 
Amendment may face strong competition from foreign speech 
regimes on its own turf.386 As Mark Tushnet has observed, there is no 
certainty that the speech standards that will emerge from this process 
will converge with current First Amendment interpretations.387 
The First Amendment's territorial domain has expanded to some 
extent through various exportation mechanisms. As a result, domestic 
speakers and intellectual property owners have gained some extrater-
ritorial First Amendment protections. More significant expansion of 
the First Amendment's territorial domain will take place, if at all, as a 
result of carefully considered foreign policy decisions relating to free-
dom of information; it will generally take place on international stages 
rather than in domestic legislatures and courts. 388 
382 See Lyall, supra note 263 (noting the effect of U.S. court decisions and libel 
tourism laws on British lawmakers). 
383 On constitutional norm transmission generally, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A 
NEw WoRLD ORDER 65-103 (2004); Tushnet, supra note 373, at 988-95; Lorraine E. 
Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CoN-
STITUTIONAL IDEAS 84 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). 
384 SeeTushnet, supra note 373, at 988-90 (describing various top-down processes 
that may lead to global constitutional harmonization). 
385 See GoLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 155 ("These inevitable cross-border 
effects do not undermine the legitimacy of a nation applying its laws to redress local 
harms_"). 
386 See infra Part IILC. 
387 See Tushnet, supra note 373, at 1003. 
388 But see BoLLINGER, supra note 4, at 116--19 (encouraging Supreme Court to 
advance cause of free press in global forum). 
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2. Extraterritoriality and the Negative First Amendment 
As noted earlier, there is strong textual, theoretical, and prece-
dential support for extraterritorial application of First Amendment 
expressive guarantees to citizens (and perhaps legal resident aliens) 
located abroad.389 Although no court has expressly held as much, at 
least in this respect the First Amendment's negative proscriptions 
ought to apply without regard to territoriality. As noted earlier, the 
more difficult question is whether the First Amendment's domain 
might actually be more universal or global, insofar as its negative 
prohibitions may apply to aliens located abroad. Although there is 
some precedential support for such an expansion, there are also some 
substantive and theoretical obstacles that must be overcome if the ter-
ritorial reach of the First Amendment is to be expanded in this sense. 
a. First Amendment Functionality 
As noted earlier, Boumediene clearly adopts a functional method-
ology for determining whether habeas corpus applies extraterritori-
ally. As Gerald Neuman has observed, however, the decision leaves 
many questions unanswered.390 One of the most important of these 
unresolved issues relates to the territorial scope of constitutional liber-
ties other than the writ, in particular those set forth in the First 
Amendment and other Bill of Rights provisions. 
The only non-immigration decision to consider in any depth 
whether the First Amendment's free speech guarantee applies to 
aliens abroad was decided prior to both Verdugo-Urquidez and 
Boumediene. As noted earlier, in DKT Memorial Fund the D.C. Circuit 
held that aliens located abroad lacked prudential standing to chal-
lenge U.S. funding restrictions on foreign speech.39I 
In a post- Verdugo-Urquidez case, Lamont v. Woods, 392 the Second 
Circuit addressed whether the First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause applied to what it referred to as "governmental activities having 
extraterritorial dimensions."393 In Lamont, federal taxpayers chal-
lenged the appropriation and expenditure of public funds for the 
construction, maintenance, and operation of religious schools 
389 See supra notes 288-92 and accompanying text. 
390 See Neuman, supra note 308, at 286-87. 
391 See DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for lnt'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 285 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (holding that aliens lacked prudential standing to bring First Amendment 
claims). 
392 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991). 
393 Id. at 834. 
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abroad.394 Using Verdugo-Urquidez as an analytical framework, the 
court held that the Establishment Clause "should apply 
extraterritorially. "395 
The court concluded that the challenged funding decisions 
occurred in the United States. 396 Still, the court held that the expendi-
ture of tax dollars for support of religious schools offended the Estab-
lishment Clause "regardless of the physical situs of those institutions 
or activities."397 It concluded that "general principles of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence provide no basis for distinguishing 
between foreign and domestic establishments of religion."398 Accord-
ing to Lamont, the Establishment Clause limited governmental power 
abroad because its proscription attached to funds being spent by 
aliens overseas.399 The court was quick to note, however, that aliens 
would not be entitled to challenge either a grant or denial of aid.400 It 
also noted that "the foreign policy ramifications of applying the Estab-
lishment Clause to [the subject grants] will be minimal."401 
Lamont provides only limited support for extending First Amend-
ment speech, press, and association protections to aliens beyond U.S. 
borders. Again, the actual governmental conduct in Lamont occurred 
inside the United States and the benefits of the Establishment Clause 
accrued only to domestic U.S. taxpayers. Moreover, the history of 
extraterritorial application, the nature of establishment itself, and the 
policies underlying the Establishment Clause do not necessarily 
extend to speech and other First Amendment liberties. Still, Lamont 
provides a functional framework for assessing the extraterritoriality of 
First Amendment guarantees that is more consistent with modem 
precedents than the decision in DKT Memorial Fund, which dismissed 
the First Amendment claims of foreign grant applicants largely on the 
basis of the immigration exclusion precedents.402 
394 /d. at 828. 
395 /d. at 835. 
396 /d. at 834. The court concluded that historical evidence that the Establish-
ment Clause applied in U.S. territories suggested that the prohibition applied extra-
territorially. See id. at 838. But application in U.S. territories speaks only to the 
intraterritorial First Amendment, not to whether the Establishment Clause applies in 
territories abroad. 
397 /d. at 839. 
398 !d. at 840. 
399 /d. 
400 /d. 
401 /d. at 841. 
402 See supra notes 321-26 and accompanying text. 
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Boumediene rejects the bright-line distinction between citizens and 
aliens set forth in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez. 403 
But the Boumediene decision is itself territorial, in the sense that it 
turns substantially on U.S. control over the territory at issue-Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba. At a minimum, however, the Court's functional 
approach supports extraterritorial application of First Amendment 
speech and association guarantees in the case of aliens held in U.S. 
custody or within territory under U.S. control. Thus, the First Amend-
ment would arguably apply were U.S. officials to abduct, detain, and 
prosecute alien critics of U.S. foreign policy in certain locations 
abroad or inside the United States.404 
There is still the question of degree of application, however. As 
Gerald Neuman has observed, the extent of First Amendment protec-
tion abroad may depend on such factors as "where the speech 
originated, where its intended audience was, and the location of 
detention and trial."405 Substantive questions also abound. Does the 
prior restraint doctrine apply? Is the government generally prohib-
ited in the foreign context from basing decisions on content or view-
point? Can alien detainees or "enemy combatants" raise First 
Amendment defenses? 
There will clearly be limits to the First Amendment's extraterrito-
rial domain. Neuman posits, for example, that "First Amendment 
equality principles would not give nationals of countries where the 
United States subsidizes a pro-American political party a legal basis for 
objection," even though such biased funding would implicate the First 
Amendment within the United States.406 Nor, presumably, would for-
eign nationals have a right to challenge U.S. propaganda activities, 
even if they would be illegal if conducted in the United States.407 Sim-
ilarly, Boumediene's functional approach would not seem to lend any 
403 See Neuman, supra note 308, at 272 (" Boumediene provides a long overdue repu-
diation of Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez . ... "). 
404 !d. at 287. 
405 !d.; see also id. at 288 ("[T]he functional approach does not present a binary 
choice between nonapplication of a constitutional right and application of the right 
precisely as it operates in an analogous domestic setting."). The mutuality of obliga-
tion approach would also counsel in favor of application of the First Amendment in 
this context. See Neuman, supra note 316, at 2083. 
406 Neuman, supra note 308, at 287. 
407 See Jeff Gerth, Military's Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2005, at 1 (describing various aspects of a broad "information war" being 
conducted in various parts of the world). Domestic limits on government propa-
gandizing are rather hazy. They reside principally in appropriations laws that forbid 
agencies from using federal funds for propaganda purposes. See KEviN R. KoSAR, 
CoNe. RESEARcH SERV., Pusuc RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA 4-5 (2005), available at 
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support to aliens' free speech and association challenges to U.S. fund-
ing conditions that restrict speech and association abroad-unless, 
perhaps, as in Lamont the court was to view the funding decisions as 
having occurred within the United States. There may also be practical 
obstacles to enforcement of First Amendment rights abroad, includ-
ing diplomatic complications and international differences with 
regard to substantive speech protections.408 Finally, it is not clear 
whether alien-to-alien communications that take place in foreign terri-
tories would be subject to any First Amendment protection at all.409 
In sum, under existing precedents any extension of the First 
Amendment's territorial domain is likely to be rather minimal and 
incomplete. This is due, in large part, to the uncertainties attending 
Boumediene's functional and practical standard. Whenever practical 
necessities weigh in the balance, predictions obviously become more 
difficult. We can say that in certain limited contexts the First Amend-
ment likely follows the flag to some foreign territories; we just cannot 
say for certain whether or to what extent it might catch up to it. 
b. Extraterritoriality and First Amendment Justifications 
There is an additional, and in some sense antecedent, obstacle to 
expansion of First Amendment protections to speakers and audiences 
located abroad. Because the First Amendment has been treated pri-
marily as a domestic concem, little attention has been paid to justifica-
tions for extraterritorial application. If the First Amendment's 
territorial domain is to be expanded, the extension must be accompa-
nied (or perhaps preceded) by an adequate theory or justification. 
This point actually applies to cross-border information exchange gen-
erally; but it is particularly important in terms of expansion of the 
First Amendment's negative liberties. In short, expansion of the First 
Amendment's domain abroad must be preceded by more careful con-
sideration of the relationship between the First Amendment and for-
eign speakers and audiences. 
As noted earlier, traditional justifications for free speech include 
facilitating self-governance, the search for truth, and self-actualiza-
tion.410 The justifications for protecting free speech may differ 
http:/ /www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32750.pdf (describing legal limits on agency 
propagandizing). 
408 Neuman, supra note 308, at 288. 
409 See Roosevelt, supra note 312, at 2066 (expressing doubt that alien-to-alien 
communications abroad serve either the democratic or the self-actualization purpose 
underlying the First Amendment). 
410 See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text. 
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depending on whether the speaker, the audience, or both are located 
within or outside U.S. territory. 411 Thus, we must first differentiate 
among five basic categories of speakers and audiences: ( 1) both 
speaker and audience are domestic; (2) the speaker is foreign and the 
audience domestic; (3) the speaker is domestic and the audience for-
eign; ( 4) the speaker is domestic and the audience is mixed (i.e., both 
domestic and foreign); and (5) both speaker and audience are 
foreign. 412 
We may easily dispense with Category 1, which does not raise any 
issues of extraterritorial application. Category 2 involves the First 
Amendment right of U.S. listeners to receive foreign speech. As 
noted in Part I, the Supreme Court has recognized this right in the 
context of attempted bans on the entry of visiting scholars and other 
alien speakers. It has held that the domestic audience has a right to 
receive the speech in person, subject to any reasonable and bona fide 
justifications for denial of entry.413 This right presumably extends to 
receipt of foreign expression and ideas more generally.414 Of course, 
this does not mean that import restrictions and even outright territo-
rial barriers regarding certain materials cannot be justified. It means 
only that the government must justify such bans in light of First 
Amendment concerns. Although the Court itself has not explained 
the justification for the right to receive foreign speech, it may plausi-
bly be considered either critical to the search for truth, on the under-
standing that the marketplace of ideas is not territorially confined to 
the United States, or as an aspect of citizens' interest in self-govern-
ance-i.e., in hearing for themselves what foreign speakers have to 
say, particularly, but not exclusively, about matters of public concern. 
Categories 3 and 4 relate directly to the various import and 
export restrictions discussed in Part I. Given that an increasing 
amount of communication from domestic speakers to foreign audi-
ences will occur via the Internet, in many cases it will not be possible 
to distinguish between domestic and foreign audiences. Hence the 
411 They may also differ depending on the content of the speech. Political dis-
course, for example, tends to receive greater First Amendment consideration than 
commercial speech and other nonpolitical discourse. Here, however, I am primarily 
concerned with the territorial reach or domain of traditional First Amendment justifi-
cations or theories, rather than the results in any particular context. 
412 The permutations are actually more numerous and complex. For example, a 
foreign audience might be composed of both aliens and citizens. For purposes of the 
present discussion, however, the five basic categories will suffice. 
413 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
414 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (recognizing a right 
to receive foreign communist propaganda). 
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audiences will be "mixed."415 Thus, some Category 1 justifications will 
be present in these situations. In that event, traditional First Amend-
ment justifications may support some protection for at least the purely 
domestic component of the expression.416 
But suppose the audience the domestic speaker wishes to reach is 
composed solely of foreign listeners or recipients (Category 3). 
Addressing only the narrow but (as shown in Part I) important cate-
gory of scientific and technical expression, Robert Kamenshine has 
argued that "generally cited first amendment values have little or no 
application" to this scenario.417 He claims that even assuming the sub-
ject of the communication is foreign policy, "[n] o first amendment 
self-governance interest exists in informing foreign nationals on the 
debate."418 Similarly, Kamenshine argues that "[a]ssisting foreign 
nationals to find truth ... is not a first amendment goal."419 That is 
so, he says, "unless we internationalize our concept of the first amend-
ment."420 Kamenshine also dismisses any self-fulfillment rationale for 
protecting speech to foreign audiences. Even assuming that a domes-
tic speaker has an interest in self-fulfillment in Category 3, Kamen-
shine claims that "no United States constitutional interest arises in 
fostering the self-fulfillment of a foreign citizen."421 For this and 
other reasons, he finds the self-fulfillment rationale substantially 
wanting.422 
In sum, at least with regard to scientific and technical expression 
Kamenshine argues that traditional First Amendment theories or justi-
fications-self-governance, the search for truth, and self-fulfillment-
do not apply to domestic speech communicated solely to foreign audi-
ences. But Kamenshine's position seems to apply more broadly to 
speech with foreign audiences, regardless of content. In general, he 
states: "We are not constitutionally committed to facilitating [First 
Amendment] objectives abroad."423 
415 See Kamenshine, supra note 1, at 873-75 (discussing First Amendment justifica-
tions in the context of mixed audiences). 
416 /d. 
417 Id. at 866. 
418 Id. at 867. 
419 /d. at 868. 
420 /d. (emphasis added). 
421 /d. at 873. He claims that the case for protection is particularly weak when the 
domestic speaker is a corporation. /d. at 869. 
422 Kamenshine claims that the pure self-fulfillment scenario is quite rare, given 
the breadth of the self-democracy and marketplace justifications. /d. at 871. He also 
notes that the Supreme Court has never indicated how much weight ought to be 
given to pure self-actualization in free speech cases. /d. 
423 /d. at 869. 
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Kamenshine's analysis predates globalization, digitization, the 
softening of U.S. borders, and the jurisprudential ascendance of the 
functional approach to constitutional domain. But it remains perhaps 
the most careful analysis of the territorial dimension of First Amend-
ment justifications. Other commentators have agreed with Kamen-
shine's principal claim that First Amendment justifications do not 
apply to speech with foreign audiences or to alien-to-alien 
communications. 424 
In contrast, however, some courts have stated that the First 
Amendment protects cross-border communications with foreign audi-
ences.425 Moreover, First Amendment scrutiny was applied to some of 
the export controls discussed in Part I even though the recipients or 
audiences were solely foreign.426 As discussed earlier, U.S. borders 
were softened in part owing to judicial recognition that the First 
Amendment applies to cross-border communications. But neither 
commentators nor courts have provided any real justification, with 
regard to Category 3 situations, for either a territorial or more global 
approach. This theoretical gap is a significant obstacle to expansion 
of the First Amendment's territorial domain. 
Recent debate has centered on Category 5, which involves speech 
solely among foreigner speakers and audiences (alien-to-alien 
speech). Kermit Roosevelt claims that while the self-governance the-
ory might justify granting some First Amendment protection to com-
munications between foreign speakers and domestic audiences 
424 Several commentators who have addressed the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign libel judgments appear to take the position that the traditional justifica-
tions for the First Amendment apply only to domestic speakers' communications to 
domestic audiences. See Derek Devgun, United States Enforcement of English Defamation 
judgments: Exporting the First Amendment?, 23 ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 195, 203 (1994); 
Sharon E. Foster, Does the First Amendment Restrict Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
CofrYrightjudgments and Arbitration Awards?, 10 PACE INT'L L. REv. 361, 390 (1998); 
Jeremy Maltby, Note, Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The Enforcement of Foreign Libel 
judgments in US. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1978, 2007 n.160 (1994); Joel R. 
Reidenberg, YahooandDemocracy on the Internet, 42JURIMETRICSj. 261,267 (2002). But 
see Van Houweling, supra note 251, at 714 ("The First Amendment should protect 
speech to foreign audiences even if the amendment is concerned primarily with 
domestic self-government."). 
425 See, e.g., DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for lnt'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 295 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (recognizing "the right of Americans to maintain First Amendment rela-
tionships with foreigners"); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 509 n.9 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (indicating approval of the district court's holding that the First Amend-
ment protects communications with foreign audiences). 
426 See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (subjecting export 
restrictions to First Amendment scrutiny); Kam v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 
9-12 (D.D.C. 1996) (same). 
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(Category 2), it does not support application of the First Amendment 
to purely foreign communications.427 As well, echoing Kamenshine, 
Roosevelt observes that "it is hard to see why the Constitution would 
be concerned with the self-actualization of aliens abroad."428 
Gerald Neuman agrees that the U.S. government has no obliga-
tion to facilitate self-actualization abroad. But, he asks, "[I] s it so clear 
that no First Amendment concerns are raised when the government 
reaches out to crush aliens' self-actualization abroad?"429 Neuman 
objects to Roosevelt's position in part on the ground that accepting it 
"exposes [nonresident aliens] to whatever prohibitions Congress 
decides to enact."43° Certainly, he argues, if the United States were to 
enact and enforce a criminal law banning aliens' broadcast of certain 
videos or prohibiting espousal of certain ideas and sought to enforce 
such a law domestically, the First Amendment would apply.431 He sug-
gests it may also apply to prosecutions conducted outside U.S. bor-
ders. 432 In sum, it is a close question whether, even in Category 5 
cases, there might be some justification for applying First Amendment 
restrictions. 
A strict territorial approach seems out of step with the changes in 
the relationship between territory and the First Amendment discussed 
in this Article. Exemptions for "informational materials," prohibitions 
on ideological decisionmaking at the border, liberalization of travel 
restrictions, and prohibitions on viewpoint-based discrimination in 
customs laws and regulations are all obviously related to First Amend-
ment concerns. Indeed, a prominent goal of liberalization and deter-
ritorialization is to facilitate associations and communications with 
foreign speakers and audiences. 
Moreover, courts and legislatures often appear to ascribe to a 
nonterritorial view of the First Amendment's justificatory domain. As 
noted, the First Amendment presumptively applies to citizens who 
travel abroad to communicate with foreign audiences. As noted, 
many courts have proceeded on the assumption that communications 
with foreign audiences are subject to the same or similar protection as 
those with domestic recipients. With regard to enforcement of for-
eign libel judgments, courts have expressed concern over the possibil-
ity that communications with foreign audiences will be chilled. 
Finally, the intent of proposals such as the Global Online Freedom 
427 Roosevelt, supra note 312, at 2066. 
428 /d. 
429 Neuman, supra note 316, at 2082. 
430 /d. 
431 /d. at 2082-83. 
432 /d. at 2083. 
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Act is to advance freedom of information solely among nonresident 
aliens-a pure Category 5 context. It is not so clear, then, that First 
Amendment justifications have no extraterritorial weight or 
application. 
Certainly traditional First Amendment theories-self-governance, 
the search for truth, and self-actualization-were designed for domes-
tic purposes and with domestic speech in mind. But the globalized 
world is some distance removed from Meiklejohn's model "town hall" 
meeting.433 There is not adequate space in this Article to fully 
develop a plausible theoretical account that might justify expansion of 
the territorial domain of First Amendment guarantees. I will focus 
here on but one salient effort, namely the "democratic culture" theory 
articulated by Jack Balkin.434 Balkin does not expressly claim that his 
theory applies in foreign contexts. But I believe it is broad enough to 
encompass some cross-border and extraterritorial concerns. 
Balkin's central point is this: "The digital age provides a techno-
logical infrastructure that greatly expands the possibilities for individ-
ual participation in the growth and spread of culture and thus greatly 
expands the possibilities for the realization of a truly democratic cul-
ture."435 He does not indicate where this "democratic culture" exists, 
or might exist. 436 But Balkin's focus on new technologies of commu-
nication and the diverse cultures they create suggests that his 
approach may be universally applicable. As Balkin states: "Like 
democracy itself, democratic culture exists in different societies in 
varying degrees; it is also an ideal toward which a society might 
strive."437 Freedom of speech, Balkin notes, "protects the ability of 
individuals to participate in the culture in which they live and promotes 
the development of a culture that is more democratic and par-
ticipatory."438 Balkin's focus on appropriation of materials and coop-
eration among speakers in geographically distinct societies-what he 
calls "glomming on"-also suggests an expansive conception of the 
433 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 25-27 (1960) (invoking town 
hall metaphor to explain the theory of democratic self-government). 
434 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 33-45 (2004). 
435 /d. at 6. 
436 Balkin does note, however, that the digital revolution makes it easier to cross 
cultural and national boundaries, and thus to "interact with and form new communi-
ties of interest with people around the globe." /d. at 7-8. 
437 /d. at 4. 
438 /d. (emphasis added). 
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expressive community with which the First Amendment is 
concerned. 439 
To be clear, I make no claim that Balkin's theory presents a 
wholly satisfactory justification for expansion of the First Amend-
ment's territorial domain. It does suggest, however, that a narrow 
focus on the more traditional First Amendment justifications may 
obscure more contemporary justifications for protecting speech 
outside U.S. territorial borders.440 On this view, opening our borders 
to facilitate the free flow of information does not necessarily have to 
be about citizens' self-governance or self-fulfillment (although these 
may also be viable justifications). Rather, the justification under a the-
ory that better fits our digitized and globalized world may be that 
moderating border restrictions or applying the First Amendment even 
to alien-to-alien communications will lead to the spread of democratic 
cultures regardless of location. A more contemporary First Amendment 
theory like Balkin's suggests that laws that interfere with cross-cultural 
exchange or suppress participation in creating a democratic culture 
may be inherently suspect under the First Amendment. 
At present, however, we do not have a full-blown justification for 
extending the First Amendment's domain to alien speakers and audi-
ences abroad. If there is to be a further expansion of the First Amend-
ment's extraterritorial domain, this theoretical gap will obviously have 
to be filled. 
C. The Transnational First Amendment 
Finally, there is one other important sense in which our First 
Amendment may become less territorial and more cosmopolitan. As 
noted earlier, exportation of the First Amendment will generally 
occur as a result of international negotiations rather than domestic 
decrees. In a globalized world, the laws of many nations may have 
extraterritorial effect or influence. As has long been the case, the 
First Amendment will have to compete with other speech regimes for 
territorial influence. Thus far, I have discussed de-territorialization as 
a liberalizing force that will facilitate cross-border and perhaps even 
purely foreign expression. But de-territorialization may push in the 
opposite direction. Rather than exportation of the First Amendment, 
the flattening of territorial borders may lead to the importation of 
foreign speech standards and principles. 
439 See id. at 1 0-ll. 
440 See Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 
427, 438-39 (2009) (arguing that the self-government justification is too narrow in a 
digital age in which expression transcends the nation-state). 
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Importation of foreign speech regimes may occur in a variety of 
ways. As the Yahoo! case suggests, foreign courts may seek to apply 
foreign speech laws extraterritorially. More generally, processes and 
mechanisms associated with transnationalism, including multinational 
treaties that establish global speech standards, may pose some threat 
to First Amendment protections currently available within U.S. 
borders.441 
As Harold Koh has explained, a nationalist approach looks 
inward and is characterized by a commitment to territoriality and 
resistance to international law and process as meaningful constraints 
on domestic authority.442 A transnationalist approach, by contrast, 
"assumes America's political and economic interdependence with 
other nations operating within the international legal system."443 The 
transnationalist accepts that "one prominent feature of a globalizing 
world is the emergence of a transnational law, particularly in the area 
of human rights, that merges the national and the international."444 
Koh has described a "transnational legal process" in which "domestic 
systems incorporate international rules into domestic law through a 
three-part process of interaction, interpretation, and norm 
internalization."445 
Debates concerning transnationalism encompass some very 
broad themes, including the role of state sovereignty in an increas-
ingly globalized world. Transnationalism touches upon everything 
from U.S. participation in international criminal tribunals, to citation 
of foreign authority by domestic courts. 446 Insofar as the First Amend-
ment is concerned, the debate centers more narrowly on whether 
441 For an elaboration of transnational legal process, see Harold Hongju Koh, 
How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. LJ. 1397, 1399-1408 (1999); 
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479, 1501-03 
(2003). 
442 See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 
43, 53-54 (2004) (explaining aspects of "transnationalist jurisprudence"). 
443 Id. at 53. 
444 Id. 
445 Id. at 55; see supra note 441. 
446 On citation of foreign authority, see Roger P. Alford, Misusing International 
Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Consti-
tutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARv. L. REv. 109 (2005); 
Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the "opinions of Mankind": International Law in Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 261 (2005); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad 
when Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections, 39 TEx. INT'L LJ. 353 (2004); 
Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy 
over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1275 (2006); Ernest A. 
Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARv. L. REv. 148 (2005). 
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international speech norms and rules will ultimately disregard U.S. 
territorial boundaries. The specific concern is that transnational 
processes may displace what has long been exceptional American tol-
erance for certain types of expression.447 A transnational First 
Amendment would offer less protection for hate speech, expressions 
of religious and perhaps other forms of bigotry, commercial speech, 
and libelous speech. It would offer greater protection to equality and 
dignity interests, as is the case in other constitutional democracies.448 
Transnational processes have already altered domestic speech 
policies in certain respects. Several laws and regulations discussed in 
Part I were moderated in response to the 1975 Helsinki Accords,449 
which required greater freedom of movement across national borders 
for people and ideas.45° For example, the Moynihan-Frank Amend-
ment prohibited the exclusion or deportation of any alien for her 
political beliefs or for any actions that, if engaged in by a U.S. citizen, 
would be protected by the First Amendment.451 In this and other 
instances, international processes played some part in softening U.S. 
territorial borders. 
Of course, moderating the territorial First Amendment is not the 
same as altering longstanding domestic standards regarding hate 
speech, incitement, libel, and commercial speech. By what mecha-
nisms might international norms and standards be imported? What is 
the likelihood that they will actually come to govern domestic speech 
liberties? 
The most direct mechanism for importing foreign speech norms 
and standards to the United States would be via treaty or other inter-
national agreement. The historical understanding is that treaties can-
not override individual rights.452 But in a globalized world, even this 
longstanding proposition has been contested. Peter Spiro has argued 
that with respect to some norms, "a case can be made for the interna-
tional determination of baseline rights."453 Spiro challenges what he 
447 With respect to America's free speech exceptionalism, see generally Frederick 
Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN ExcEPTIONALISM AND HuMAN 
RIGHTS 29 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
448 Tushnet, supra note 373, at 1003. 
449 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 
1292. 
450 See SASSEN, supra note 341, at 68. 
451 !d. at 68-69; see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
452 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,16-17 (1957) (plurality opinion) (asserting that 
in exercising power under an international agreement the United States must observe 
the Constitution's prohibitions). 
453 Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. 
REv. 1999, 2001 (2003). 
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:4 
calls the "doctrine of constitutional hegemony"-the notion that con-
stitutional rights have always prevailed over treaty obligations.454 
Although he acknowledges that a consensus still exists among U.S. 
policymakers and judges that treaties cannot override constitutional 
rights, Spiro claims that constitutional hegemony is less categorical 
than often assumed.455 He asserts, for example, that where a treaty 
provision conflicts with domestic constitutional liberties, courts are 
likely to modify constitutional doctrine rather than invalidate the 
treaty.456 
With specific regard to the First Amendment, Spiro cites Boos v. 
Barry,457 in which the Supreme Court struck down a law limiting pro-
tests within a certain distance of foreign embassies in Washington, 
D.C.458 The Boos Court merely suggested that compliance with inter-
national law could be recognized as a compelling interest supporting 
the measure and that "the dictates of international law [might] 
require that First Amendment analysis be adjusted to accommodate 
the interests of foreign officials."459 If this were the case, the First 
Amendment would be interpreted to conform to the treaty, rather 
than the other way around. In that event, Spiro claims that America 
might be "ceding rights autonomy."46o 
Spiro also provides a normative argument for subordinating 
domestic constitutional rights to treaty and other international obliga-
tions. Rather than achieve this through something like transnational 
legal process, Spiro points to the treaty power itself as the instrument 
of subordination.461 He argues that in a world in which international 
human rights are being constitutionalized, and in which territorial 
borders and national institutions "do not necessarily enjoy normative 
foundations," there is no a priori reason for privileging domestic con-
stitutional norms over international ones.462 Spiro concludes that in 
this environment, "an international norm against hate speech would 
supply a basis for prohibiting it, the First Amendment 
notwithstanding. "463 
454 !d. at 2017-27. 
455 See id. at 2017-18. 
456 See id. at 2019 (discussing the Chemical Weapons Convention and Fourth 
Amendment concerns). 
457 485 u.s. 312 (1988). 
458 See id. at 315, 329; Spiro, supra note 453, at 2019-20 (discussing Boos). 
459 See Boos, 485 U.S. at 324. 
460 Spiro, supra note 453, at 2020-22. 
461 See id. at 2021-22. 
462 !d. at 2022-23. 
463 !d. at 2025. 
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These are, of course, fighting words to nationalists and territorial-
ists. "Ceding rights autonomy" may be code for ceding territorial sov-
ereignty itself. But there are several reasons why domestic-rights-
subordinating treaty provisions and judicial pronouncements estab-
lishing a transnational First Amendment are not likely to materialize. 
First, as even Spiro concedes, "[i]t is unlikely in the extreme that 
... treatymakers would undertake such a frontal assault against the 
supremacy of constitutional rights."464 He notes that "it would take a 
constitutional moment of the highest order to overcome the 
supremacy norm."465 The United States has proven time and again 
that Spiro's intuition is well founded. It has consistently rejected, or 
qualified its participation in, treaties and international agreements 
that threaten to depart from domestic speech norms. 466 As Spiro 
points out, the United States has been quite content to risk incurring 
economic or other costs from its refusal to subordinate domestic 
speech norms. 467 
Second, notwithstanding the willingness of some U.S. judges to 
engage foreign authority in resolving certain domestic constitutional 
issues, courts in particular would not seem to be very likely sources of 
constitutional rights subordination. Domestic courts are inclined to 
interpret human rights provisions in treaties as non-self-executing.468 
Moreover, the Boos example does not signal any broad movement 
toward an international or transnational First Amendment. It is one 
thing to express concern for the safety of foreign diplomats on U.S. 
soil in the face of public protests. It is quite another for a U.S. court 
to subordinate the law of libel, incitement, and other substantive 
speech doctrines to some supposed international consensus.469 Boos 
464 Id. 
465 Id. 
466 See id. at 2018 (discussing, as an example, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which requires parties to prohibit so-called "hate speech"); see 
also Neil MacFarquhar, Concerns Keep U.S. from Talks on Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
2009, at A7 (noting that the United States declined to participate in a conference 
owing to concerns regarding proposed condemnation of expressions of religious 
bigotry). 
467 See Spiro, supra note 453, at 2018, 2020-21. 
468 See Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 851, 855 (1989) (discussing the United States' avoidance of human rights 
provisions). 
469 In situations in which the Supreme Court has recently alluded to foreign 
precedents and practices to inform its constitutional decisions, it has reached for for-
eign sources in part because the history and tradition with respect to the relevant 
norm was arguably uncertain. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 
(2002) (referring to the opinion of the "world community" in assessing whether exe-
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does not come close to supporting that degree of cession or subordi-
nation. Further, as we have seen, U.S. courts have almost uniformly 
refused to enforce foreign libel judgments obtained under laws con-
trary to the First Amendment-notwithstanding the fact that this 
ignores established rules relating to foreign judgment recognition 
and, in some cases, the strong interests of other nations. 
Third, the internationalism or transnationalism approaches 
incorrectly assume that some global consensus on speech norms can 
be readily discovered, or already exists, even among comparable con-
stitutional democracies. Contrary to the wishes of Internet exception-
alists, who long for a single speech standard for Internet 
communications, and transnationalists, who seek uniform human 
rights standards, speech norms remain diverse. 470 As Saskia Sassen 
has noted, even in a global era "[t]here is no globallaw."471 We ought 
not to forget that the U.S. has tried, and failed, to export the First 
Amendment to nations that embrace different values with respect to 
freedom of information.472 
Fourth, and finally, there is a rather curious assumption that 
internationalism will automatically result in the subordination of U.S. 
speech norms. As Sassen has pointed out, however, transnationalism 
and internationalism have generally been a form of Americanization in 
areas ranging from environmental protection to human rights.473 
Indeed, despite the recent citation of foreign authorities in U.S. judi-
cial processes, the flow of constitutional norms, including First 
Amendment norms, has generally favored U.S. expansionism rather 
than transnationalism.474 Thus, for example, international and trans-
national processes may ultimately result in the subordination or liber-
alization of British libel standards rather than diminished protection 
for false statements of fact inside the United States. 
cution of mentally retarded persons comports with evolving standards of decency). 
That is certainly not the case with regard to core free speech standards and principles, 
which have a long domestic pedigree. It is hard to imagine, for example, that the 
Court (or any legislature) could ever be persuaded to subordinate New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan to foreign libel norms. 
470 See generally KROTOSZVNSKI, supra note 374 (comparing how values such as mili-
tant democracy, culture, community, and a limited constitution shape speech norms 
in the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom). 
471 SASSEN, supra note 341, at 17. 
472 See generally BLANCHARD, supra note 266 (describing unsuccessful efforts at the 
United Nations to export First Amendment free press principles). 
473 SASSEN, supra note 341, at 18. 
474 See Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trafk in the American Bill of Rights, 88 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 537, 552-58 (1988) (discussing "overseas trade in Anlerican first amendment 
values"). 
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None of these points refutes the argument that transnationalism 
and internationalism could affect domestic speech rights in some 
respects. As already mentioned, U.S. borders have been liberalized in 
part as a result of international accords and agreements. As Boos 
shows, a certain minimal respect for international law may lead to 
some consideration of foreign interests in speech cases. But at this 
point, any alarmism over invading foreign speech norms, the Europe-
anization of the First Amendment, and loss of constitutional sover-
eignty seems unwarranted. As in other respects, through the lenses of 
internationalism and transnationalism, the First Amendment appears 
less territorial. But America's domestic free speech exceptionalism is 
not in any imminent danger of being subordinated to international or 
transnational norms. 4 75 
CONCLUSION 
Far too little attention has been paid to the First Amendment's 
territorial dimension. The relationship between territorial borders 
and the First Amendment is complex. It has changed dramatically 
during the past few decades. Whether one is speaking of persons or 
materials, crossing the border remains a significant First Amendment 
event. A territorial framework, elements of which have been in place 
since the founding of the nation, continues to restrict cross-border 
movement and information exchange to some extent. But our First 
Amendment is more cosmopolitan today than perhaps any other time 
in the nation's history. Speech, press, and associational liberties are 
far less territorially constrained. Legal and regulatory liberalization, 
combined with modernizing forces such as globalization and digitiza-
tion, have pulled back the "nylon curtain" that once served as a hard 
content and ideological barrier at the nation's borders. The gradual 
softening of U.S. borders has opened new markets for information 
exchange, decreased reliance on ideological exclusion, and facilitated 
cross-border expression and association. Regulatory de-territorializa-
tion of the First Amendment has not resulted in a loss of U.S. sover-
eignty, nor has it threatened our domestic security. 
Globalization and digitization have flattened territorial borders in 
other respects as well. Regulatory laws and constitutional liberties 
increasingly extend beyond territorial borders. This form of de-terri-
torialization has raised fundamental questions about the character 
475 Transnationalism would not likely result in any complete subordination in any 
event. It is more likely that transnational processes may lead to some convergence of 
First Amendment norms, rather than wholesale displacement. See Tushnet, supra 
note 373, at 987 ("[G]lobalization does not entail uniformity."). 
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and dimension of First Amendment liberties. Is the First Amendment 
a domestic regime that benefits only citizens and legal resident aliens 
inside the United States? Or is it more akin to a universal human 
right? U.S. laws, policies, and precedents do not provide consistent 
answers to these questions. Efforts to export First Amendment norms, · 
standards, and principles abroad suggest a more cosmopolitan con-
ception of the First Amendment. On the other hand, some courts 
and scholars continue to resist the conclusion that the negative con-
ception of the First Amendment fully constrains U.S. officials regard-
less of location. 
Regardless of the position one takes on the proper dimensions of 
the extraterritorial First Amendment, it is clear that efforts to export 
the First Amendment by legislative fiat or judicial decree will be signif-
icantly hampered by diplomatic, international, political, jurisdictional, 
and theoretical limitations. De-territorialization has increased global 
competition among free speech regimes. In the future, some of the 
most important questions pertaining to the First Amendment's scope 
are likely to involve jurisdictional or conflicts oflaws issues.476 Moreo-
ver, the First Amendment's territorial fate rests partly upon the formu-
lation of a theory or justification for its extraterritorial application. As 
well, in the international marketplace of free speech regimes the First 
Amendment will compete against foreign speech standards that may 
be imported as a result of internationalism or transnationalism. For 
now, at least, the First Amendment's intraterritorial exclusivity seems 
secure. But global competition will force the United States to reflect 
further upon, and be prepared to defend, its exceptional speech 
regime. 
476 See generally Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. 
REv. 311 (2002) (advocating a "cosmopolitan conception of jurisdiction"); Paul Schiff 
Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Inter-
ests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1819 (2005) (advocating a more cosmopolitan 
approach to choice of law). 
